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The ideas presented in this thesis are intended to pro-
vide the basis for a common understanding of the concept of
acquisition strategy as applied to the acquisition of major
weapon systems. Data gathered from both interviews and a
comprehensive literature survey indicated that no common
understanding of acquisition strategy exists. No conceptual
framework to deal with the problems commonly associated with
the acquisition process was found in the literature.
Acquisition strategy is discussed in terms of a two-
phased continuum consisting of formulation and implementation.
An appreciation of the interrelationships between these two
phases is believed to be the key to development of a frame-
work for understanding past acquisition problems and dealing
with potential future problems, as they develop, in a rational
manner. A new way of thinking about the acquisition of major
weapon systems is described which links the processes of
formulation and implementation thereby lending a common
understanding to the acquisition process.
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This thesis was initially intended to study the concept
of acquisition strategy based on the collection of empirical
data through the combined techniques of interview and ques-
tionnaire. Concepts ascertained from the analysis of
collected data were then to be compared with past and present
literature on the subject. Preliminary interviews were con-
ducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in May 1976. It
became increasingly clear, as the number of interviews grew,
that the interviewers were having to answer more questions,
posed by the interviewees about the nature of acquisition
strategy, than were the interview subjects themselves.
While almost all interview subjects initially claimed an
understanding of the concept, none could formulate a com-
plete or comprehensive definition. A typical response to
the question- -"what does the phrase acquisition strategy
mean to you," was "what does it mean to you?" The program
manager for a major weapon system, when asked the question
answered "I don't get involved in that at all." When
pressed who did get involved, the program manager asked
the interviewer if he could please explain his usage of
the terms so as to establish a common ground for discussion.

A relatively high ranking career civil servant answered that
acquisition strategy was really a fancy name for advanced
procurement planning, that is, the summation of all business
considerations of a major program. While there were, in
retrospect, some highly enlightened, well thought through
responses, they were clearly in the minority. It became
most apparent, after analysis of those initial interviews
that very little thinking had been done by the majority of
practitioners on the subject. It was therefore determined,
due to obvious semantic difficulties having arisen so early
in the research effort, that rather than pursue such an
empirically based study, a conceptual approach would be
most beneficial. In doing so, it is hoped that a baseline
definition for future work has been created. Any further
work on the subject can then utilize the conceptual frame-
work which we hope to have created for comparison with
empirical data collected as we had originally intended to do.
A comprehensive literature search was conducted into both
public and private sector publications pertaining to the
broad fields of systems acquisition management on the one
hand, and new product development on the other. While^
there is reference to the concept of acquisition strategy
in the Department of Defense 5000 series directives and
most recently in the Office of Management and Budget
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Circular A-109, there is noted otherwise, an almost total
absence of such reference in any other document, public or
private. The most closely aligned literature found was
that pertaining to the study of corporate or business policy
and corporate strategy. It is from that discipline that
much of our concept has been derived. Generally, what in-
formation could be found on acquisition strategy pointed to
a narrow, poorly defined concept which was almost universally
linked to the procurement function. Specifically, acquisi-
tion strategy was most frequently associated with the
business related functions of major systems acquisition.
The practices of assessment of enemy threat (environ-
mental assessment) , engineering design and development, long
range planning and policy formulation, and resource alloca-
tion are normally associated with the Planning Programming
and Budgeting System/Joint Strategic Planning System (PPBS/
JSPS) processes within the Department of Defense. The initi-
ation and evolution of a major weapon system seems to be
viewed by many as a sequential fallout from those two pro-
cesses, an occurrence seemingly requiring little separate
planning or consideration. To support that observation, it
can be said, when viewed from the perspective of an individual
in the acquisition process, that decision making for most
major weapon systems is widely fractionated. It would appear
11

that no effective planning can be carried out because it
is difficult to associate many of the decisions made with
a specific strategy or long range plan since they occur at
such widely separated times and organizations within the
DOD.
It is our belief that a common matrix can and must be
established which can associate those widespread activities
occurring in the acquisition process as they pertain to a
particular weapon system. The literature review reveals
no such matrix is recognized by practitioners. The concept
of acquisition strategy as expressed in this work was
developed in an attempt to link those seemingly unrelated
activities in the acquisition process by providing visibility
to the definite and obvious relationships discovered during
this thesis effort, which exist between them. The acquisi-
tion process has infrequently been viewed as an integrated
whole because of its tremendous size and amorphous nature
(which is spread out over a thirty year time horizon)
.
A concept such as acquisition strategy, which intention-
ally makes maximum use of existing procedures, policies and
documentation but can relate or integrate activities pre-
viously thought to be unrelated, within the acquisition
process, has particular intuitive appeal. It will only
involve a shift in the thinking of individuals about their
12

day-to-day activities and will require that emphasis be
placed on how each activity fits the overall long range plan,
Unfortunately, it appears that just that process, that of
altering one's thinking, when such alteration is necessary,
is the most difficult thing to change. Patterns of thinking
which have evolved over many years become increasingly diffi-
cult to alter. Resistance to change has frequently been
noted as the greatest obstacle to progress.
A trend, an evolutionary development in the process of
acquisition of major weapon systems can be seen to have
occurred during the last thirty years. It is our belief
that the evolution has culminated in the Report of the
Commission on Government Procurement; the first report or
document to view the acquisition process using a systems
approach. It is our intent to build upon that monumental
effort by reemphasizing the need for an integrated approach
to decision making and in doing so, provide a point of
departure from the daily activities routinely carried out
by thousands of DOD civilian and military employees. It is
hoped that through their understanding of acquisition
strategy, a better understanding of their role in the
acquisition process will follow. Through the concept of
acquisition strategy, we hope to provide a framework which
13

structures the numerous differentiated parts of the process
into an integrated, meaningful and comprehendable whole.
A note on readership. This thesis is directed to the
reader who is familiar with the specialized language, the
jargon, of the acquisition process.
14

II. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
A. USE OF TERMINOLOGY
This thesis is written on the premise that a clear and
concise understanding of the concept of acquisition strategy,
by all participants in the military acquisition process, will
contribute to imrjpovement in the planning, procurement and
maintenance of major weapons systems. It is considered
important, at the outset, to establish as clearly as possible
the manner in which the terminology - acquisition strategy -
will be used throughout this thesis.
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109 defines
the acquisition process to mean "the sequence of activities
starting with reconciliation of mission needs and goals
with capabilities, priorities, and resources and extends
through the introduction of a system into operational use
or the otherwise successful achievement of program objec-
tives." (1) The word acquisition will be used in the manner
outlined above, however it is pointed out that while design
and management activities conducted during the "acquisition
process" as defined above end for all intents and purposes
upon introduction into operational use, the life cycle has
or should have been planned and considered in the formative
15

stages of the systems evolution. Therefore, the acquisition
process, or in the context of this thesis, acquisition, will
be considered to include, explicitly, life cycle planning
considerations. It is noted, parenthetically, that this
definition of acquisition includes the planning of military
strategy, the business related activities generally associated
with the procurement function and the technical activities
generally associated with the engineering function.
The term strategy is somewhat more difficult to defini-
tize. In the pure military sense, the word strategy is
generally associated with the notions of tactics and logis-
tics. In the literature on the subject, the traditional
concept of military strategy is "the art of employing mili-
tary forces to achieve the ends set by political policy." (2)
A more detailed definition of military strategy is the
"science of combining and employing the means which the
different branches of the art of war afford, for the pur-
poses of forming projects of operations and directing great
military movements; the art of moving troops so as to be
enabled to either dispense with a battle or to deliver one
with the greatest advantage and with the most decisive
results; generalship. Strategy is the provision, prepara-
tion and use of diplomacy and of the nations armed forces
in peace and war to gain the purpose of war." (3) That
definition includes the concept of logistics.
16

Tactics is defined in the traditional literature to
mean "the use of armed forces to gain victory in battle," (3)
and as "the art of using weapons in battle in such a way
that they make the maximum impact." (2) Logistics in the
traditional usage is defined simply as the "science of supply
and movement." (2)
It appears, based on the definitions provided above, that
the aim of strategy, in the traditional sense, is to fulfill
the objectives laid down by policy, making the best use of
available resources. It can be inferred that the basic,
underlying, objective of traditional military strategy is
to "disregard the method by which the decision is to be
reached and consider only the outcome which it is desired
to achieve." (4) There is the clear implication that the
ends justify the means; the means is therefore of less sig-
nificance than the ends. Thus, excluded from the traditional
definition of strategy are the choices of goals and the de-
tailed plans or actions for achieving them. Traditional
military strategy thus appears to be the marshalling of
resources which will provide the best opportunity for tactics
to be effective.
The pure military definition of strategy will not suffice
for use in the more "business" oriented activity of acquisi-
tion of major military weapons systems. It does have obvious
17

applications, particularly in the early stages of the so
called "requirements determination 1 ' phase, which will be
discussed in some detail later, and can be considered to
have general applicability to certain activities later in
the acquisition process. It can be said that the concept
implied by military strategy is the backdrop against which
our definition will be built.
We subscribe to a definition of strategy which is implied
in the study of business policy. (5) In shifting from con-
siderations of warfare to those of "business," the rather
clear differences which can be seen to exist between strategy
and tactics gives way to more imprecise methods for separating
goals from objectives; for choosing the methods for securing
and deploying resources appropriate to those goals; and for
establishing the policies which guide uses of resources and
determine programs which are to be undertaken. The business
of government is generally more imprecise and disorderly than
warfare; its objectives are usually multiple and various and
can normally be arranged in some hierarchy ranging from
mandatory to discretionary. In warfare, the objectives are
more clear cut and precise. Strategy, as used in our defini-
tion of acquisition strategy, is an extension of the tradi-
tional military definition but includes the choices of goals
and objectives as well as the plans for attaining them. For
18

our purposes, "strategy is the pattern of objectives, pur-
poses, and goals and the major policies and plans for
achieving those goals... ." (5) Strategy has the additional
attribute, in our usage, of being long term in nature, and
simultaneously able to supply direction and guidance for
short-term operations. We therefore find that strategy
is also "...the determination of the basic long-term goals
and objectives of an. .. (agency). . .and the adoption of courses
of action and allocation of resources necessary for carrying
out these goals." (6)
For convenience, the military usage of the word strategy
compares most closely with the concept of long term alloca-
tion of existing resources among alternatives with the objec-
tive of producing a resource allocation pattern offering the
best potential for meeting goals and objectives. Strategic
decisions then would deal with policy formulation which has
wide ramifications, a long time perspective and involve the
use of critical resources. Tactical decisions, on the other
hand, involve ensuring the efficient and steady use of
current resources when allocation has already been decided.
Rather than to adhere to the use of military terminology
of strategy and tactics, our purposes will be better served
by dividing acquisition strategy into two separate but highly
related phases. The first phase shall be referred to as
19

formulation, which encompasses the ideas of long term policy
determination and resource allocation. The second phase
shall be termed implementation and shall encompass the ideas
of efficient and well managed use of resources. The two
phases of acquisition strategy which we perceive, will be
the subject of extensive analysis in the following sections.
Before turning to those sections however, consideration of
the inherent limitations of acquisition strategy will be
valuable.
B. SOME LIMITATIONS OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The long range planning aspects of acquisition strategy
as described above are not without obvious limitations (5)
.
Planning ahead may pose certain difficulties. The environ-
ment is becoming increasingly complex. The accelerating
rate of change in both military and industrial technology
makes it particularly difficult to predict the future in
detail. Long range plans cannot, therefore, be quantita-
tively detailed, and the degree of accuracy to be expected
of the futures forecast is all but unknown. However, while
at first these various criticisms may seem to represent real
limitations on the value of long range planning, it is their




very existence which makes such planning necessary. The
more uncertain the threat, the more necessary it is to con-
template what may or may not happen and make adequate
advance preparation for its eventuality.
A more serious limitation may be that overdedication
to any plan may result in lost opportunity leading to un-
fulfilled goals and objectives. The determination of a
strategy must include provisions for flexibility among com-
peting alternative solutions. What must be achieved is a
moving balance among the considerations upon which the strat-
egy is based. This concept has considerable application in
the implementation phase, where faced with the management
of a major weapon system, the program manager must constantly
shift emphasis among the competing aspects of his program.
Acquisition strategy must progressively evolve in the direc-
tion which satisfies the long range goals and objectives of
the Department of Defens e. ;;Another important limitation of
strategy is in the inevitable conflict which results between
the formulators of long range policy and the various organi-
zations which must carry out those policies. This last
limitation is certainly present within the Department of
Defense as evidenced in the findings of the Navy and Marine
Corps Acquisition Review Committee (NMARC) , Army Material
Acquisition Review Committee (AMARC) and Acquisition Advisory
21

Group (AAG) reports which will be analyzed in some detail in
later sections of this thesis.
The limitations of acquisition strategy, therefore can be
seen to consist primarily in the inherent difficulties of
conceiving of a viable pattern of goals and objectives and
the formulation of policy by which they are to be implemented,
(5) Acquisition strategy is not at all intended to be a sub-
stitute for judgment or a shortcut to wisdom. It is not a
panacea and in itself, cannot point out the course of action
to be taken in a specific situation. However, if military
major weapons are to be properly acquired, proper advanced
planning, strategic planning, must be formulated and
implemented.
C. CONCEPT OF THE ACQUISITION MANAGER
Before turning our attention to the two phases which
comprise our concept of acquisition strategy, it will be
advantageous to review another concept essential to the
following discussion. That concept is one of the "acquisi-
tion manager" and the acquisition management function. It
is our belief that only an acquisition manager can effec-
tively and efficiently formulate acquisition strategy. For
those readers familiar with the concept of the general
22

manager* the following discussion merely defines that func-
tion in military terminology. The following discussion is
theoretical in nature. No acquisition manager is specifically
called out, or defined in any current DOD directive in the
sense we shall describe.
The acquisition manager is a generalist by virtue of his
assignment, not by nature and rarely by training. His loyalty
can be to no functional specialty or process, i.e. procure-
ment, engineering, or financial management, rather it must
be to the most effective utilization of resources applicable
to the successful fulfillment of the mission of his organiza-
tion. It is his responsibility to properly manage and super-
vise an optimum combination of the specialized functions or
departments or agencies of his organization; it is he who
supplies them with resources and direction appropriate to
the contribution which they are expected to make to overall
organizational goals.
The acquisition manager must rely on a tier of functional
specialists or managers for his principal support, each more
knowledgeable than himself within a particular area, each
with a pride in his own expertness, and each committed to
A complete discussion of the concept of general management
can be found in Andrews (33) . Much of the following is
adapted from his discussion.
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furthering the interests of this own function. Witness,
for example, the rivalry which exists between the various
services, each headed by a senior military officer committed
to the superiority of his own service. The acquisition
manager is the manager or head of an executive agency or a
department within that agency, or he may be a senior staff
member of an acquisition manager. Wherever resident, he
must have a total organizational perspective, even if one
of his private concerns is for the contribution that he or
his subordinates can make to the operating organization.
He therefore must have a clear understanding of organizational
purpose in order to know what specialists he will need and
how to coordinate their output with that of the overall
organization. The acquisition manager must maintain surveil-
lance over the actual attainment of results, formally or
informally. He is expected to make himself, or at least
preside over the process of making policy decisions which
affect the future of the organization. He is therefore the
one who chooses or ratifies the choices of goals and per-
forms some kind of planning function which ensures that those
goals can be achieved on schedule. He must somehow set direc-




The acquisition manager is looked upon to achieve results.
To do so, he must remain continually informed about the status
of ongoing programs as well as the impact which environmental
assessment is making on the validity and accuracy of existing
plans. He must be ready to intervene in crisis and take
decisive action. Lower level managers carry out the imple-
mentation of policy set by the acquisition manager and his
staff. In summary, the nature of acquisition strategy must
be made to dominate the design of organizational process and
structure; it is the responsibility of the acquisition manager
to see that it is so.
It has been indicated that there are two interrelated
phases of our concept of acquisition strategy. There are
also believed to be two tyoes of management functions associ-
ated with that concept. The two management types are no more
distinct or isolated than are the two aspects of acquisition
strategy. Each manager is dependent on outsiders for approval
and direction. For example, while the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) is the senior formulator of policy and allocator of
resources, the President and Congress have final approval
authority. In some cases, an implementer may be required to
act in the role of formulator and vice versa. The most ex-
treme case was reported in the TFX Contract Investigations (7)
when former SECDEF McNamara actually took over program
25

management responsibilities in the F-lll aircraft develop-
ment program in what became known as "Project Icarus." There,
he, the most senior formulator of acquisition strategy, was
involved in the daily operation and decision making of a major
weapon system. There is no reason to assume that such action
will automatically or inevitably lead to disasterous results.
Certainly, if one individual took over personal control of
all programs in the Department of Defense, there would even-
tually be total chaos. We contend, that when acting in the
capacity as both formulator and implementer of acquisition
strategy, it is all too easy to confuse the two functions.
Those who formulate acquisition strategy require a degree
of detachment from the pressures of daily operating problems.
We believe it to be preferred that the two functions be
handled by different individuals. We postulate that many
of the problems present in the acquisition of major weapons
systems, so well documented by Peck and Scherer (8) and
Fox (9) may well be, in part, attributable to a confusion
of the role being played. It is when the formulator performs
implementation and vice versa, or when the proper role to be
played is ambiguous, that the potential for problematic re-
percussions is initiated. As noted earlier, a total organi-
zational perspective is necessary for a manager to carry out
acquisition management or acquisition strategy functions and
26

we would add that this perspective includes a clear under-
standing of the role he plays at any particular moment.
The distinction between formulator and implementer of
acquisition strategy is not as clear cut as might be inferred
from the discussion thus far. For example, the SECDEF and
Deputy SECDEF (DEPSECDEF) are clearly acquisition managers
(more properly they are executives) who formulate acquisition
strategy. The program manager and contracting officer can
be classified as implementers of acquisition strategy. How-
ever, the various staffs within the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) may be viewed as having dual or sometimes
conflicting roles. For example, DDR&E may be viewed as both
formulator and implementer. When acting in the capacity as
advisor to SECDEF on policy matters, he is a formulator.
When acting as member of the DSARC panel, he and his staff
may variously be viewed as implementer or formulator of
policy. Finally, when DDR&E prepares the Technology Coor-
dinating Paper (TCP) , he may be viewed as implementer of
acquisition strategy. A point which should not pass un-
mentioned is that it is not the carrying out of a dual func-
tion by an acquisition manager that may cause problems to
surface. In many cases, the ambiguity caused by the dual
role may lead to confusion in the minds of other managers
as to the role being played at a specific point in time.
27

The so called staff/line ambiguity as pointed out in the
Report of the AAG (10) can be viewed as a manifestation of
the latter circumstances.
To provide a more explicit classification of players for
the purposes of this thesis, Figure 1 has been developed to
conceptualize the relationship between the functions per-
formed by various individuals. The SECDEF and all Deputy
and Assistant Secretaries and staffs will be viewed as formu-
lators of acquisition strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
will also be viewed as formulators . The Service Secretaries
and Service heads (CNO, Chief of Staff of the Army, etc.)
will be viewed as having dual roles as both formulators and
implementers of acquisition strategy. Since this thesis
deals exclusively with major weapons systems, the roles
played by the latter individuals as discussed herein will be
more heavily weighted on the side of implementation. Since
the individual services do have cognizance over less than
major programs, they certainly have formulation responsi-
bilities in those programs. In the major systems arena, it
is the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF who are primarily tasked with
policy formulation. (11) Following this logic, the program
















As the principal implementer of acquisition strategy,
the program manager must himself formulate an acquisition
strategy. OMB Circular A-109 states that "an acquisition
strategy must be tailored for each individual system program
as soon as a determination is made to solicit design con-
cepts which could lead to the acquisition of a new major
system." (1) That requirement for an acquisition strategy
encompasses what we have referred to as implementation and
entails developing an implementation plan. A-109 continues
to state "such strategy should include test and evaluation
criteria and business management considerations such as the
timing of essential elements of the acquisition process
(as earlier defined) . . .whom to solicit .. .and selection of
contract types. The contracting process should be recognized
as an important tool in systems acquisition." (1) The use
of the terminology acquisition strategy in A-109 is more
narrowly applied than our definition and excludes in depth
analysis of the so called military strategy considerations
which have been referred to and will be discussed later
under the formulation phase. We believe that the program
manager will be carrying out what we define as implementa-
tion when he formulates his acquisition strategy as re-
quired above. It has been pointed out that the program




In our context, the program manager is viewed as a functional
specialist who knows more about his program than any other
individual. As a "product manager" the program manager must
believe in the supremacy and importance of the product he
is developing. He must strive to produce the best system
he can within the constraints established by the formulator
of policy. The program manager should strive to attain the
overall organizational perspective required of a higher level
acquisition manager; he does not have such a perspective by
virtue of his position. It is one of the functions of the
acquisition manager, as a generalist, to make optimal use of
the program manager's advocacy.
The concept of general management and its relationship
to the formulation and implementation of acquisition strategy
has been reviewed. There appears to have been, to a greater
or lesser extent, an absence of an awareness of our concept
of acquisition strategy in major weapons systems acquisition,
particularly in the implementation segment. This apparent
lack of awareness appears not to be due to an absence of a
clearly defined matrix or skeleton for acquisition strategy
in the basic fabric of government. Rather, it appears to be
in a general lack of proper exercise of the general manage-
ment function by senior level and intermediate level govern-
ment executives. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSCS)
31

and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
certainly form the basis for the formulation segment of
acquisition strategy. They represent the matrix or skeleton
referred to above. The 5000 series DOD Instructions and
service implementation certainly form policy for the imple-
mentation of acquisition strategy. It is not their presence
or absence, of late, which has caused problems in major
weapons systems acquisition. Rather, we believe it is the
manner in which the general management function is coordinated
with these systems and directives.
The discussion of the concept of acquisition strategy,
is not new or startling. The authors make no claim to have
invented it. "Form the start, McNamara viewed the military
planning technique as comparable to business planning, except
possibly for the difference in vocabulary. The plans dealt
with numbers (i.e. dollars, men, weapons, ships sunk, air-
craft missing or destroyed, casualties suffered and prisoners
taken). The sources of these numbers were previous wars,
armed forces exercises, maneuvers, and simulated war games.
Alternatives had to be identified and their cost and effec-
tiveness compared. It was then a question of the best buy
for a given budget, or the forces with the lowest cost to
achieve a given set of objectives." (12) As McNamara saw
it, the problem was to relate three key elements: the
32

strategic concept, the budget, and force structure. "This
set of concepts formed the basis of the system developed
by McNamara, his direct staff, the joint chiefs and thou-
sands of military and civilian personnel in various service
branches at the Pentagon." (12) McNamara described his
philosophy of management as "based on a decision pyramid
and a system of administration in which all possible de-
cisions are made at the bottom of the pyramid. ...there
must be a framework within which those decision can be made,
Basic policies must be established against which a decision-
maker at the lowest levels can compare his decisions and
gain some confidence that he is acting in accordance with a
pattern of decisions elsewhere in the organization. And it
is the establishment of these policies that can only be
made at the top." (13)
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III. THE PROCESS OF FORMULATION OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY
A. PHASE OVERVIEW
As noted earlier, acquisition strategy is believed to be
comprised of two equally important phases which are highly
interrelated. The two phases will now be separated both
for purposes of discussion and also for diagramming. It
should be kept in mind, however, that no precise definition
of one phase without the other is complete; only through a
clear understanding of both phases and how they interact
synergistically can the nature of acquisition strategy be
understood. Figure 2 represents a broad conceptual model
of the interrelationships which should exist between the
two phases - formulation and implementation.
Formulation of acquisition strategy is the rational pro-
cess of deciding what the agencies or departments long range
plans and policies are to be and how available resources are
to be allocated. Formulation is accomplished in four over-
lapping stages which are separable for discussion but not in
practice. The first stage is the evaluation and assessment
of the enemy threat in relation to existing capabilities.
Stage one will later be discussed in detail, but suffice it
















































Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG) by the SECDEF.
The DPPG is promulgated in order to establish the preliminary
strategic framework for the three phases of the PPB System.
The DPPG represents the SECDEF 's principal statement of
broad strategic guidance for defense planning. It sets
forth the current objectives, policies and planning guidance
for the U.S. defense program. The DPPG provides the essen-
tial national security policies established or confirmed by
the current administration. It elaborates on those policies
by providing broad strategic guidance for force planning in
regard to the missions and tasks U.S. forces must be pre-
pared to perform. It additionally provides the assumptions
to be made in sizing forces and allocating resources without
specific fiscal restraints.
To provide definitive policy and force planning guidance
upon which all defense planning and programming are based,
the SECDEF issues the Planning and Programming Guidance Memo-
randum (PPGM) . That document provides annual guidance that
must be observed by the JCS and other DOD components in the
formulation of force structures and the Five Year Defense
Plans (FYDP's). It also provides the guidelines to be used
by SECDEF ' s staff in analysis and review of proposed pro-
grams. Unlike the DPPG, the PPGM pays particular attention
to the allocation of resources realistically assumed to be
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available. In the manner described, the second stage of
the formulation of acquisition strategy, as presented in
Figure 2, is believed accomplished with the issuance of the
PPGM. It provides guidance and policy for the determination
and allocation of resources consistent with stage one. It
is noted that final authority for fiscal resource allocation
rests with the congress. However, stage two is believed
carried out by the SECDEF when his decisions, regarding
probable allocation of resources, are promulgated.
The third stage of formulation is the determination of
preferred alternatives or approaches to counter assessed
mission area deficiencies. The DSARC process is designed to
make the decisions necessary for the final selection of those
alternatives best suited to accomplishment of goals and ob-
jectives identified in stage one. The fourth and final stage
of formulation is the identification and promulgation of
overall policy and organizational structure to accomplish the
goals and objectives determined in stage one. The SECDEF
has promulgated such policy in the 5000 series DOD instruc-
tions which provide overall policy guidance to the various
components of DOD. The organizational structure necessary to
accomplish stage one goals and objectives is promulgated or
determined at the service or service head level. Review of
stage four will be delayed until the discussion of implementation
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in later sections of this thesis. It is noted in passing
that policy and procedures for implementation can be an
outgrowth of any stage of acquisition strategy. Figures 3
and 4 demonstrate the relationships between the four stages
of the formulation segment. In our discussion of stage four
later, it will be viewed from the perspective of the imple-
menter of acquisition strategy. The following summary of
activities during the requirements determination process is
designed to provide additional insight into the formulation
phase and particularly into the first three stages outlined
in Figure 2.
B. FORMULATION OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The discussion which follows is intended to describe the
first three stages of the process of formulation of acquisi-
tion strategy. It is not designed to be an all inclusive
coverage of the heretofore labeled "requirements determina-
tion" process as it currently exists. There is no precise
correlation of the PPBS/JSPS interface and related service
processes, for identifying needs and establishing require-
ments, with our description of the formulation phase. Rather
than pursue an academic discussion of the existing system,
our discussion will attempt to fit the relevant existing
























Relationship of Policy to the Formulation Phase
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framework of acquisition strategy which we have described
thus far. In doing so, particular attention will be given
to where the "orderly" process has been perceived to break
down. Since "the findings of several recent study groups
indicate that problems which appear during the system acqui-
sition cycle can be traced directly to shortcomings in the
requirements determination process..." (14) it is our belief
that an analysis of this process as viewed from the perspec-
tive of the acquisition manager may be very productive. Not
only will it lead to a better understanding of our concept
of acquisition strategy but it may also provide a new view
of the mechanisms which have caused those problems. The
discussion will also be stated in such a way as to attempt
to promote a better understanding of the heretofore con-
sidered "complex," "unstructured," "variable" and "poorly
understood" process of requirements determination. It is
our belief that the absence of a general management perspec-
tive has caused the requirements determination process to be
viewed by many as widely diffused and governed by a low
visibility of key decisions. The process, without a general-
ises perspective has become many unrelated centers of activity
without a center of control, leading to unharnessed optimiza-
tion of each functional interest but a lack of overall
appreciation for the basic purpose of the process.
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Figure 5 represents a general conceptual model of the
initial three stages of the process of formulation of
acquisition strategy. The numerous products of the PPBS
and JSPS which make major contributions to the formulation
process are included; the absence of other documents should
not be interpreted to imply their lack of contribution,
rather, they are simply not central to our discussion.
1. Stage 1 - Determination of Goals and Objectives
National Security Policy forms the backdrop against
which all decisions in the formulation phase are justified
or rationalized. As a member of the National Security
Council (NSC) , the SECDEF contributes to the establishment
of that policy. The evaluation and assessment of the environ-
ment as carried out by various agencies of government, in-
cluding reconciliation of assessed enemy capabilities with
United States capabilities, is the process which gives rise
to Defense Department goals and objectives. Such assessment
forms input to NSC study groups which utilize the information
in National Security Study Memorandums (NSSM) . When NSSM's
are ratified by the President, they are issued as National
Security Decision Memorandums for government -wide implementation,
As noted earlier, the DPPG is the keystone of this
stage of acquisition strategy. The establishment of goals

































Policy is generally under the direction of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) . Figure 6 shows the relationship of the JCS
to the SECDEF and the military services. The JCS are charged
by the SECDEF with specific planning responsibilities. It
is through the long and short range planning carried out by
the JCS that the basic input to the DPPG is developed. The
planning carried out by the JCS is packaged in several docu-
ments. Figure 7 shows the time frames associated with the
documents which will be discussed. Figure 8 reveals the inter-
relationships between those key planning documents and pro-
vides their classification into three major categories:
strategic, intelligence, and R&D. These basic categories
provide data for all three stages of formulation but principally
for stage one.
Major military weapon systems are developed to pro-
vide service lives of as much as three decades. In order
for acquisition strategy to be meaningful, it must be based
on planning which encompasses a future time horizon sub-
tending the projected life of the weapon systems contemplated
and in development. The JSPS utilizes a twenty year time
horizon which is adequate for the purposes of the formulation
of acquisition strategy. Future planning is divided into
short range (1-10 years) and long range (10-20 years). Short
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vulnerabilities, likely courses of actions of potential
enemies of the United States, probable enemy strategy, and
likely courses of actions of important communist and non-
communist nations are examples of relevant information for
short term planning required of a formulator of acquisition
strategy. Such information is currently contained in the
Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP) , a major
output of the JSPS . Intelligence estimates summarizing
factors and trends and the liklihood and capabilities of
important foreign nations to undertake courses of action
which could affect the national interest of the United
States are examples of relevant information for long term
planning required of the acquisition manager formulating
acquisition strategy. Such information is currently con-
tained in the Joint Long Range Estimative Intelligence
Document (JLREID) , another major output of the JSPS. The
two documents referenced above contain the intelligence
input to the DPPG. In the past, long range documents have
been vague and general in nature and have thereby been ren-
dered almost useless as planning documents. Additionally,
intelligence documents have been based on a "cover all bets"
philosophy by projecting a "greater than expected" threat.
If the information contained in these documents is to be of
value for the formulation of acquisition strategy, it must
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be objective and a realistic evaluation of projected future
trends based on information which is understood to be im-
perfect. However, purposely overcautious or inflated esti-
mates of enemy threat can only invalidate the goals and
objectives which are formulated in stage one, and contribute
to problems later in the acquisition process. A potential
result on the allocation of resources for example, of in-
flated estimates, is to eliminate potentially needed systems
from emerging in some mission areas at the expense of exces-
sive development in others. So called "gold-plating" or
premature obsolesence of systems may be viewed as the eventual
outgrowth of improper intelligence estimates, or improper
assessment.
Strategic considerations are also of interest to
formulators of acquisition strategy. The DPPG is based in
part on strategic considerations as perceived by the JCS
.
Short and mid range military strategy and force structure
to attain stated United States National Security Policy
objectives is contained in another product of the JSPS , the
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) . The long range
strategic implications of the projected worldwide economic,
political, social and technical trends are covered by the
Joint Long Range Strategic Study (JLRSS) , another output of
the JSPS. Thus, the DPPG is viewed as an analysis of both
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worldwide intelligence information and the strategic world
situation providing an acquisition manager the framework
from which to develop an acquisition strategy. It provides
the basic statement by the SECDEF of current DOD objectives,
policies, and planning guidance for the United States Defense
program.
2. Stage 2 - Allocation of Resources
Allocation of resources to provide for fulfillment
of goals and objectives established in stage one and pro-
mulgated in the DPPG must be based upon analysis of military
strategy and force structures (necessary to attain National
Security Objectives), available technology, and perceptions
of the individual services of resources necessary to comply
with published guidance. It is common knowledge that past
problems which were manifested by interservice rivalry for
funds and poor cost estimating, have always plagued this
stage. It is not surprising that each service should see an
existing or developing enemy threat predominantly in terms
of its own capabilities to counter such threat. The proper
balance of forces to counter the threat, as seen from the
perspective of each service will be to maximize its own
role. This general phenomenon which has been labeled
"parochialism" will be discussed in greater detail in
following sections when dealing with Navy determination of
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needs. Of greater importance here, than the actual reasons
for parochialism within the services is the potential
created for needless waste of scarce government resources.
It is here, particularly, that the "general management"
perspective of the SECDEF is necessary to ensure that as
nearly an optimal allocation of resources as possible is
accomplished. We therefore believe that the proper role
of the SECDEF in carrying out this phase of acquisition
strategy is to reconcile specific deficiencies noted in
phase one with overall defense goals and objectives, and
determine appropriate allocation of resources to the ser-
vices which will best support National Security Objectives.
In many cases, the SECDEF may take advantage of interservice
rivalry when investment of small amounts may result in the
availability of alternative approaches from which to make
final decisions. However, this activity must be pursued
carefully and rationally in order to avoid a runaway compe-
tition which escalates into numerous unnecessary solutions
looking for problems to solve.
Strategic considerations such as force structure
requirements to cope with global and regional threats ; the
capabilities of the major programmed forces to meet the
assessed threat; requirements for possible mobilization of
United States forces, and planning, modernization and
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procurement objectives must be clearly defined if defini-
tive resource allocation is to be promulgated by SECDEF.
The JCS publish such data in the Joint Strategic Objectives
Plan (JSOP) volume II. Additionally, the JCS interpret R&D
objectives responsive to the strategy and force recommenda-
tions referred to above, based on broad trends and antici-
pated future technologies required to furnish military
forces with the capabilities needed to execute the pre-
scribed military role. The relative importance of the R&D
objectives considered essential to support strategy and
military objectives are analyzed by the JCS and published
for SECDEF review in the Joint Research and Development
Objectives Document (JRDOD) . To further provide the SECDEF
an overall orientation to R&D programs being carried out by
the services, DDR&E prepares Area Coordinating Papers (ACP)
,
Mission Concept Papers (MCP) , and Mission Area Summaries
(MAS) as well as the Technology Coordinating Paper (TCP)
.
These documents provide the SECDEF with an overview of each
mission by identifying existing or anticipated problems
and describing the current programs for their solutions.
The Policy and Planning Guidance Memorandum (PPGM) is based




The specific allocation of resources is made by
the SECDEF after review of major force and force related
issues requiring decisions during the current year as pro-
posed by the individual services in their Program Objectives
Memorandums (POM) . POMS provide force, manpower and material
recommendations and the risk assessment and military advan-
tages to be gained by pursuit of the courses of action
recommended. POMs are supported in Program Element (PE)
terms for major weapon systems. The Program Decision Memo-
randum (PDM) promulgates the definitive decisions of the
SECDEF on resource allocation and provides for incorpora-
tion of the major systems approved into the Five Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) . Final resource allocation is accom-
plished, at the DOD level, by Program Budget Decisions (PBD)
,
and ultimately by the President and Congress in their budget
reviews and appropriation processes. Thus, SECDEF allocates
resources realistically assumed available via the process
described above and in doing so completes stage two of the
formulation of acquisition strategy.
3 . Stage 3 - Determination of Preferred Approaches
The determination of preferred approaches to fulfill
goals and objectives, by the SECDEF, is inextricably linked
to the process for identifying needs and establishing re-
quirements by the individual services. Our discussion will
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center upon the process as it exists within the Navy and its
role in the formulation of acquisition strategy at the SECDEF
level. Similar processes exist within the other services
and therefore this discussion as well as the general con-
cept of acquisition strategy which we espouse is believed
to be equally applicable to the Army, Air Force and Marine
Corps.
Overall policy for the carrying out of acquisition
strategy (formulation stage four) is contained in DODD
5000.1. The Navy has implemented that instruction in
OPNAVINST 5000. 42A of 3 March 1976. That directive serves
as the primary guide to the research and development community
for the establishment of future weapon systems programs.
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate the relationship of policy to
the other phases of acquisition strategy in the formulation
segment. Figure 9 provides for ready reference, a summary
of the various categories of programs defined in the
OPNAVINST and Figure 10 represents a conceptual model of
the documents and organizations comprising the third stage
of the formulation phase within the Navy.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) publishes his
views regarding changes in the international scene, the
military threat, domestic attitudes and national asperations
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ways in which he hopes to meet the SECDEF guidance contained
in the DPPG, in the CNO Policy and Planning Guidance (CPPG)
.
Force and Mission Sponsors (FMS) -DCNO Subsurface Warfare
(OP-02), DCNO Surface Warfare (OP-03) and DCNO Air Warfare
(OP-05) -issue Force and Mission Sponsor Plans (FMSP) which
contain guidance for the introduction of new or modernized
weapons systems and set forth user requirements in consonance
with the CPPG. These plans set forth, as concisely as possi-
ble, the FMS perceived needs which will carry out CPPG
guidance including current FYDP approved force levels, FYDP
procurement/modification plans, and a long range projection.
It should be noted that here, the lowest level of formula-
tion of acquisition strategy which we perceive (for major
systems) , is being carried out. The officials responsible
for the preparation of FMSP later will issue definitive
Operational Requirements and sit as members of the CNO Exec-
utive Board. Operational Requirements eventually give rise
to new or modernized weapon systems. We view the issuance
of Operational Requirements by officials, inherently func-
tional specialists (i.e. Air Warfare), and members of a
specific community of Naval Officers (i.e. Naval Aviators)
to violate our concept for generalists to be in formulation




Based on the FMSP, the Director of Research, Develop-
ment, Test and Evaluation (DRDT&E) prepares Science and
Technology Objectives (STO) which describe in broad terms,
the Navy's roles and objectives anticipated in particular
warfare areas during the 10-20 year time frame. It describes
the threat which the Navy anticipates encountering, and needed
capabilities to neutralize or overcome that threat. Using
STO's, FMSP's and other pertinent documents, a Research and
Development Plan (RDP) is created which serves as a central
repository of research and development planning guidance.
That plan is divided into twelve RDT&E planning areas which
are grouped into the following major categories:
I Strategic Deterrence
II Sea Control
III Projection of Power Ashore
IV Mission Support
The Chief of Naval Material (CNM) is tasked with
detailed analysis and review of the RDP and is required to
propose potential solutions to STO's. Such documentation
is called Advance Systems Concepts (ASC) and is packaged in
Navy Advanced Concepts (NAC) documents. ASC's are then used
in an iterative fashion by FMS in refinement of their per-
ceptions of needs expressed in STO's. At the same time, at
the OSD level, DDR&E is preparing the TCP, referenced earlier,
58

to provide SECDEF a broad overview of available technology.
Figure 11 represents a conceptual model of this process.
FMSP's set forth "mission or support plans which
contain guidance for introduction of new or modernized sys-
tems and set forth user requirements objectives in consonance
with the CPPG" (15). These documents then can be viewed as
Navy interpretation of the acquisition strategy formulated
by the SECDEF. FMS later issue Operational Requirements (OR)
as was indicated earlier, when they are able to define the
specific performance parameters needed which are within the
state of the art as reflected in the NAC. The OR is designed
to be a concise statement of operational needs, and repre-
sents an attempt to state requirements in terms of broad
objectives and thereby encourage imaginative and innovative
responses from potential developers. In fact, the OR appears
to restrict and encumber imaginative and innovative responses
by requiring in a scant three pages such information as per-
formance characteristics, flight profiles, and firing rates,
etc. As noted earlier, FMS both interpret CPPG and issue
OR's. Since these officers are platform oriented by training
and position, there is evidence that they have exibited a
propensity for developing, procuring and operating their
own platform types rather than truly acting as generalists
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According to Probst and Wilson (16), FMS view everything
from their platform type and interpret the CPPG in a parochial
manner without exercising objectivity. This general tendency
was noted earlier in the discussion of resource allocation
where military services were noted to view everything with
their role as the center of solutions to newly emerging
mission deficiencies. OR's therefore are developed, possibly
unintentionally, with a built in advocacy for one platform
type. Such product orientation has contributed to the
follow-on imperative, acquisition preceding the need, sub-
version of user-producer dialogue, and restrictive statements
of need. (16) Replacement of existing weapons and ideas for
new weapons is based on familiarity rather than objectivity.
These manifestations have lead to a lack of true mission
oversight by the FMS. We do not view this situation as
startling, but rather a logical, though regretable, outcome
of failure to have acquisition managers with a general man-
agement orientation. FMS should attempt to guard against
this natural propensity if acquisition strategy is to be of
value to either formulators or implementers
.
When an OR appears to lead to a major weapon system
acquisition, will require costly R&D expenditures, or early
conceptual effort, it must be submitted to the CNO Executive
Board (CEB) and Acquisition Review Committee (ARC) for review
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and approval. It is at this point, in accordance with OMB
Circular A-109, that the SECDEF must review and approve
the need if that need is expected to lead to a major weapon
system development program. With this relatively new re-
quirement for the so called "milestone zero," the SECDEF is
entering the acquisition process earlier than in the past
when viewed from the standpoint of an implementer. Here,
the SECDEF is partially fulfilling stage three of the formu-
lation segment of acquisition strategy. He is, at milestone
zero, making the first determination of preferred approaches
to counter the threat identified in the manner described
above.
When an approved OR is promulgated by OPNAV, CNM
responds with a Development Proposal (DP) . The DP repre-
sents a range of alternatives and trade-offs to achieve
the particular range of capabilities solicited by the OR.
The DP is reviewed by OPNAV and after an iterative process
of changes, if necessary, may find the DP acceptable. It
is then reviewed by the ARC and if approved, a Navy Decision
Coordinating Paper (NDCP) will be prepared by OPNAV. The
NDCP includes a definition of program issues, the considera-
tions which support the operational need, program objectives,
program plans, performance parameters, areas of risk and
development alternatives. The NDCP is submitted to the CEB
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for approval. Once approved, it is forwarded to CNM for
start of the conceptual effort. The entry of the project
manager in accordance with A-109 into the process is inter-
preted by the authors to be shortly after the SECDEF approves
the need. This point of entry is substantially earlier than
in the past. Question can be raised as to whether the pro-
gram manager, an implementer of strategy, can perform his
role during this phase where the formulation of policy is
actively being pursued. It would seem that conflicts may
arise between the program manager and those acquisition
managers traditionally in charge of this phase of the acqui-
sition process. If it is true that the program manager is
an advocate of his system, it is questionable that he is
needed this early in the process. Certainly some general
manager must be in charge of the program as opposed to a
committee; however, the program manager as he is thought of
today is not the proper individual. The concept of acquisi-
tion strategy expressed to this point would call for a
general manager with broader perspective than today's pro-
gram manager, to act as a central decision maker for the
program being developed.
Upon completion of the conceptual phase, CNM submits
the results and recommendations to OPNAV. After OPNAV review,
if the project is ready to start the validation phase, a
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Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) outline is submitted to
OSD for approval. Based on the approved outline, OPNAV,
with assistance from CNM, the program manager, and other
cognizant commands, prepares the DCP draft. That document
is submitted to the CEB for review and approval where the
CNO establishes his formal position. The approved DCP is
then submitted to the Department of the Navy Systems Acqui-
sition Review Council (DNSARC) for approval. Once approved,
the DCP represents the official SECNAV position. The DCP is
then forwarded to DDR&E where it formally enters the DSARC
process. The DSARC decision formally completes phase three
of the formulation segment of acquisition strategy.
The central role of the generalist in the formulation of
acquisition strategy has been reviewed and the pitfalls re-
sulting from his absence, or the lack of that perspective
he brings to the process, have been reviewed and analyzed.
The formulation phase of acquisition strategy with the excep-
tion of the formulation of policy (stage four) has been
described in depth using current terminology. The formula-
tion phase of acquisition strategy which has been at first
mission and force oriented now gives way to a more specific
product orientation in order to permit the development of




IV. THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY
A. SEGMENT OVERVIEW
The implementation of acquisition strategy is comprised
of a series of activities which are primarily administrative
in nature. The use of the terminology administrative is
not meant to imply any sense of the routine, or menial ity.
In our usage of the term, administration is an identifiable
activity which includes executive action and orders as well
as the decisions necessary for coordination, appraisal and
planning the work of a department and for the appropriate
use of its resources. The implementation of acquisition
strategy must employ the same acquisition management skills
as formulation does." In general, however, the perspective
that the implementer has is less broadly defined than that
of the formulator. Once purpose or direction is determined
in the formulation segment, the resources made available
must be mobilized in support of the goals and objectives
formulated (refer to Figure 2) . The implementation of acqui-
sition strategy accomplishes this mobilization by establish-
ing a detailed organizational structure including organiza-
tional interrelationships to carry out the strategy as
formulated. This activity includes establishing proper




division of labor, coordination of divided responsibilities
and establishment of information systems sufficient to carry-
out strategy. It is this latter activity, mobilization of
resources, which is the responsibility of both the Depart-
ment Secretary, the individual service head, and also partly
the responsibility of the project manager which has caused
ambiguity in the roles played by each.
The implementer of strategy must also develop formal
plans and budgets to carry out policy. This activity would
include establishment of control systems, standards and
measurements of results obtained. Implementation of strategy
also includes the establishment of a system to provide feed-
back to senior management regarding the status of ongoing
programs including the reporting of changes in technology
or funding which may have impact on the future of the pro-
gram or entail changes in policy. This latter activity
represents the iterative nature of defense system acquisi-
tion. While feedback is continually provided to senior
management, it is formally provided in the DSARC and SAR
processes. Feedback is therefore provided both through the
mechanisms of the formulation process as well as the imple-
mentation process.
The following discussion traces the development of the
implementation phase of acquisition strategy. It is presented
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using an historical perspective in order to reveal how the
role of the implementer has changed and evolved over time.
As noted earlier, the two phases of acquisition strategy-
described are difficult to separate. The discussion will
take advantage of that inherent relationship by revealing
how its very presence has contributed to development of the
implementation function as it exists today.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY IN MAJOR WEAPON
SYSTEM ACQUISITION
1. Acquisition Strategy During the 1950 's Era
During the 1950 's and into the early 1960's, one of
the main forces driving the DOD acquisition policies was
the so-called "lead-time" problem. The U.S. was in the
midst of the "Cold War" era, with the DOD focus directed at
overcoming the Soviet missile threat. The general percep-
tion at that time was that in the technology race, the Soviet
Union could put advanced weapons through development into
inventory much more rapidly than the U.S.
If any strategy could be said to exist in most of
the DOD programs of this period, it would be characterized
by having performance and schedule as the driving factors.
Requirements were vague and poorly defined. The practice
of a high degree of concurrency in development and produc-
tion became the accepted norm. Concurrency made sense in
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the ballistic missile programs when there was at least a
possibility that national existence might be at stake. How-
ever, for most other programs, it proved to be an over-
reaction resulting in unnecessary costs.
Not only was the evolving technology new, but also
the concept of acquisition of total systems was new, un-
tested and unstructured. The interface relationships
between formulation and implementation in the acquisition
process varied from program to program. The Services played
a major role in both areas, with OSD having only a minor
part in requirements determination. Acquisition strategy
was largely absent except in terms of the intense inter-
service rivalry created by the Services in trying to expand
their authority and their share of the budget.
Cost growth, poor performance, slipped schedules,
inadequate cost estimation, duplication and overlap of
weapons among the Services, inadequate training and high
turnover of program personnel were the evident problems of
this environment. These problems and others were detailed
by Peck and Scherer (8) in 1962 in their published work,





2. Acquisition Strategy in the McNamara Era (1961-1968)
Concurrent with the publication of Peck and Scherer's
work, the public, the press, industry, Congress, as well as
many officials in DOD felt that improvements were necessary
and recognized that changes were needed in the way major
weapon systems were being managed.
In July 1965, DODD 3200.9, a major policy guidance
directive, was issued on Concept Formulation and Contract
Definition by Secretary of Defense McNamara (17). This
detailed 16 page directive provided structure by delineating
prerequisite activities that must be accomplished before
Engineering Development can be initiated. Figure 12 repre-
sents the concept of a weapon system life cycle based on
the interpretation of the above directive. The essence of
this directive is presented in Appendix A. This policy
directive had a definite impact on the acquisition process
as it existed in the decade of the 1960's. It was the first
"building block" in the establishment of a coordinated
framework of policy formulation and implementation for system
acquisition. The impacts on acquisition strategy that were
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a. Centralization of authority in OSD
Centralization of policy formulation and decision-
making governing the acquisition of major systems shifted
from the Service level to the highest levels in OSD. The
initiation of a weapon system development cycle was keyed
to a single SECDEF decision point, the conditional approval
to proceed into Engineering Development. The Secretary of
Defense now had a greatly expanded authority, responsibility
and visibility through the ability to control the start of
new programs. Subsequently, this process was expanded to
three formalized decision points and became the DSARC process
as it is known today.
b. Deficiencies in policy
This directive attempted to establish a logical
framework of dec is ion-making for program implementation that
would apply to all major DOD programs; however, it failed to
achieve this goal because of the rigid and inflexible "means"
prescribed for implementing acquisition strategy within this
directive and the prevailing SECDEF policies of the time.
Examples which illustrate the inflexibility and rigid pro-
cedures prescribed would include the following:
(1) Contracting was viewed as the primary
instrument for conducting "'business" and therefore for
preventing cost overruns. Fixed price and fully structured
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multi-incentive contracts were mandatory* based on the
policy statement for the objective of the Contract Definition
Phase. Total Package Procurement (TPP) was used to eliminate
risk and minimize management on the part of the Government.
The attitude toward the inherent "goodness" of this technique,
as espoused by a policy implementation guide of that period,
is amusing retrospectively in view of the results achieved.
"Because TPP was designed to extend the advantages
of competition at the development stage to the full
life cycle, the more requirements that can be in-
cluded in the package, the more successful the use
of TPP will be." (18)
It was not recognized that these types of
contracts and techniques may be inappropriate in many cases,
nor was it recognized that contracting by itself would fail
to solve overruns on programs destined to an overrun situa-
tion because of a poorly defined need or inadequate require-
ments determination during Concept Formulation.
(2) By explicitly limiting Exploratory and
Advanced Development to in-house effort and Government
*"The ultimate goal of Contract Definition, where Engineering
Development is to be performed by a contractor is achievable
performance specifications, backed by a firm fixed price or
fully structured incentive proposal for Engineering Develop-
ment. Any action that suggests cost sharing, .. .shall be
avoided. Contract Definition shall be conducted using
fixed price ." (17)
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laboratories*, OSD was involving itself too deeply in the
program implementation functions of the Services and was
committing programs to suboptimal weapons systems concepts.
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, David
Packard levied this criticism against primary reliance on
Government in-house design effort:
"One particular characteristic of a military
organization is that it tends to think more in terms
of getting what was effective in the last war rather
than thinking ahead in an imaginative way about what
might be needed for the future." (19)
A more fundamental issue in the above para-
graph and throughout this timeframe is the degree of control
that OSD had not only in formulation, but also in the imple-
mentation of programs. OSD determined not only what was
needed but also how it shall be done and who shall do it.
(3) A proliferation of new management tools
were forced into both the formulation of needs and program
implementation. JSPS, PPBS , FYDP, CF/CD, TPP, systems analy-
sis, cost effectiveness, Pert/Cost, Advance Procurement
Planning, Multi-incentive contracting, Life Cycle Costing,
*An excerpt from DODD 3200.9 confirms this point,
"...the interests of the Government will be best served by
using industrial organizations for the conduct of Engineering
Development. Normally, in-house laboratories can contribute
most effectively to the Exploratory and Advanced Development
effort. It is recognized that exceptions to this policy may
be necessary; where necessary, such exceptions will be
authorized on a case-by-case basis."

Integrated Logistic Support, and "ilities;" i.e. reliability,
maintainability, availability, producibility, etc., partially
enumerates the techniques that were developed to provide
overview and control of the weapons acquisition process.
Some of the above techniques, such as TPP
have fallen into disfavor because of "spectacular" and much
publicized failures. Inappropriate use of others, such as
multi- incentive contracting, and useless voluminous management
reporting requirements produced questionable results. Many
of the above techniques can be useful when applied intelli-
gently as a part of an overall acquisition strategy; i.e., a
strategy that integrates both the need formulation and pro-
gram implementation considerations. But this was not to be
recognized until almost a decade later.
(4) There is a total absence of any reference
to a Program Manager in this directive. The implied assump-
tion is that the implementation activities listed under
Concept Formulation and Contract Definition would be made to
happen because of the OSD overview and the prescribed imple-
mentation structure in the directive itself. The program
manager was not recognized as an element in the Concept
Formulation process because so much of the early conceptual
effort was prescribed by higher authority and performed
without having a program manager present. Nor was the
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importance of his role recognized in the implementation of
acquisition strategy because the policy guidance for that
phase of the program was rigid and inflexible. It con-
strained the Program Managers ' latitude for implementation
to a checklist of activities for satisfying the OSD criterion
for proceeding to the next phase in system development.
Consequently, history has demonstrated that many programs
were able to fulfill all the prerequisite activities listed
in DODD 3200.9, but could not develop a weapon system that
fulfilled a definite need or meet the program objectives for
cost, schedule, and mission capability.
3. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel-Staff Report on Major
Weapon Systems Acquisition (1969-1970)
This study briefly analyzed the problem areas in
major weapon system acquisition under the policy as estab-
lished by DODD 3200.9. Specific areas of focus were on the
"then current" DOD policy and deficiencies in the four areas
of requirements determination, the OSD decision process,
acquisition strategy, and program management. This study,
in general, was able to identify superficial and obvious
problem areas but was unable to view the acquisition process
from a broad perspective to identify causative factors for
these problems. Consequently, the recommendations proposed,
in many cases, were not true solutions to the "real" causes
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of problems which existed in the formulation of needs but
were stated to be in program implementation. Thus, many of
the Panel's recommendations restated the obvious and tried
to treat the symptoms rather than the problems in weapons
acquisition. The following will identify in more detail
the essence of this report and how it does or does not relate
to our previous discussion of formulation and implementation,
a. Requirements Determination
Under this subhead, the panel noted three
deficiencies in requirements determination. The Military
Services were faulted for developing formalized requirements
that were too specific. The second criticism focused on the
subordination of the needs of the operating forces, as noted
earlier, to parochial interests within the Services. This
criticism implied that requirements were being formulated
that were nonresponsive to the needs of the users but were
aimed more toward expanding the mission area of each Service.
The third deficiency noted was the Services' bias toward
needless oversophistication of weapon systems and the in-
ability of Services to agree on common requirements where
multi-Service needs existed for fulfilling similar missions.
What these three criticisms of the Requirements
Determination were basically implying was that the formula-




To counter the above three deficiencies, the
Report recommended more centralization of authority at the
SECDEF and OSD levels for formulation of needs. Specifically
that
"(i). The Secretary of Defense take appropriate
steps to insure that operational requirements from
Operating Commands be submitted directly to his office
for establishment of priorities and assignment to the
proper Service or Services for implementation.
(ii). The Secretary of Defense issue policy
guidance to insure that operational requirements be
stated in terms of broad objectives to encourage
imagination and innovative responses from potential
developers." (20)
The thrust of these two recommendations was to
signal the need for improving the formulation process. These
recommendations subsequently received SECDEF concurrence and
were incorporated as part of DODD 5000.1, which will be
discussed in a later section.
b. OSD Decision Process
The SECDEF role, based on DODD 3200.9 was
criticized for having only one major decision point which
commenced Engineering Development. While the decision point
itself was considered beneficial in the formulation process
because it gave the Secretary of Defense greater control
over large commitments of resources to new programs, the
deficiencies it created were felt to be -detrimental to pro-
gram implementation below the OSD level.
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Of the four deficiencies identified by the Panel
report, we feel only one had validity. That one was "the
lack of meaningful review after the initial OSD decision of
conditional approval to proceed into Engineering Development."
The other three deficiencies identified by the
Panel report, as resulting from the OSD decision process,
included (1) the overoptimism of the Services and contractors
to deal with technical unknowns; (2) increased effort on
detailed justifications and "paper studies" by the Services
in order to gain approval, rather than devoting needed effort
on development proofing of critical components; and (3) the
inhibiting effects on innovation, due to system "lock-in"
caused by the initial OSD approval with the later unwilling-
ness of the Services to challenge the credibility of the
initial OSD decision.
The problems identified were valid, but their
cause was wrongly, we feel, attributed by the Panel to the
OSD decision process. The problem of overoptimism existed
before DODD 3200.9, and we believe it exists today in pro-
grams going through the multi-review point DSARC process.
Similar rebutals can be made to counter the other two
deficiencies attributed to the OSD decision process.
In response to the four above deficiencies, the
Panel recommended a multi-decision point management system
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with three distinct decision points as contained in the
current DSARC process. However, in retrospect, the Blue
Ribbon Panel may not have arrived at the above mentioned
recommendation independently and may have been reacting
to avoid being overtaken by events in process at that time.
Mr. Packard's policy guidance memorandum on major systems
acquisition (21) in the spring of 1970 outlined the objec-
tives and the framework of the DSARC process. Interpreta-
tion of Mr. Packard's memorandum indicates that the basic
purpose of the DSARC decision process was not for eliminating
the problems noted by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Rather
it was, as we see it, to allow the formulators to view pro-
gram implementation at certain key milestones to ensure that
the program was proceeding in accordance with the original
policy objectives. Subsequently, this six page memorandum
was in total translated into DODD 5000.1, the policy docu-
i
ment that formalized the DSARC process. A discussion of this
document will be deferred to a later section,
c. Acquisition Strategy
We are forced to be critical of the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel recommendations and analyses in the "acquisi-
tion strategy" section of their report. Although they have
reached the right conclusion,
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"The present policy on acquisition strategies as set
forth in DODD 3200.9, ...is highly inflexible and does
not reflect the fact that much development effort
occurs in an unstructured manner." (20)
it was arrived at for the wrong reasons. More appropriately
this subsection in the Panel's report should have been en-
titled "acquisition techniques." Primarily, the Panel
recommends substitution of the inflexible techniques of the
McNamara era with numerous and equally inflexible techniques
of their own making. The following examples from their
report should support the above contentions.
The first recommendation by the Panel in this
section was a "giant step backwards" for systems acquisition
of major weapons. It stated, in essence, that there was too
much DOD policy emphasis on the development of full weapon
systems to the detriment of the development of subsystems,
components, and parts. Therefore, it was recommended by
the Panel to fragment the development process allowing sub-
systems, components, and parts to be developed independently
of the system needs. It is not certain that this recommenda-
tion was adopted and deliberately implemented; however,
subsequent studies, such as AMARC, NMARC , and the COGP re-
ports specifically pointed out the fallacies of this type




The second recommendation also supports the
contention that the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel did not under-
stand acquisition strategy nor the acquisition process.
They recommended the stretch-out of production over a longer
period of time to reduce the cost of modifications and
changes introduced during the production phase. Although
supporting data was not presented, the Panel stated that
their "...staff study indicated that stretched-out production
is no more expensive to the Government." (20)
Again, we do not agree with the above and we
disclaim the total concept of acquisition strategy as pre-
sented in the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report. Although
their report did go on to identify further problems and make
additional recommendations in this section, we feel it con-
tributed little to the understanding of acquisition strategy,
d. Program Management
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recognized that
the caliber and effectiveness of a program's management team
had a major impact on, what we would term, the successful
program implementation of a major weapon system. The Panel's
observations on deficiencies inherent in program management
included the following:
(1) "Program managers have neither a substantial,
well delegated, clearly defined responsibility, nor do they
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have authority commensurate with exercising the responsi-
bility. . ." (20)
(2) Excessive layers of management exist be-
tween the program manager and his source of authority. (20)
(3) "Program Management is generally not
considered an assignment which furthers a man's career.
Therefore, it is difficult to attract and retain top quality
personnel." (20)
The Panel's recommendations essentially restated
the above deficiencies in a positive fashion; i.e., "Military
Program Managers should be given authority in program manage-
ment decisions commensurate with responsibility placed upon
them." (20)
The above again illustrates that the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel did not carry through on their analyses in any
depth beyond the restatement of the obvious. It is not
enough to state that a PM's authority is not commensurate
with his responsibilities. What, we feel, needed to be
discussed in light of the above criticism, is what the role
of the program manager should be. Is it to be limited to
program implementation or will his role also include respon-
sibilities that should logically be performed by higher level
formulators? In performing his role as implementer, we con-
tend, the program manager does have sufficient authority to
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carry out the responsibilities needed to achieve program
objectives. It is when the program manager is dealing with
OSD or when he is having to justify the need for his program
before Congress, that he lacks sufficient authority. Should
the PM's authority be expanded or should the scope of his
direct and assumed responsibilities be decreased in order
to equalize his responsibilities with his authority? What
should the role and the responsibilities be for the inter-
vening OSD Staff layers in relation to both, the formulation
of needs and program implementation?
These are all questions that needed to be addressed
but were not understood at the time of the Panel's report.
The main impact of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report is
that it identified some key issues but left them to be resolved
by policy-makers at a later date. We feel it contributed
little to acquisition strategy as depicted in our framework
earlier. Historical analysis of documents indicates that
many of the issues that the Panel was grappling with were
being overtaken by the dynamic guidance provided in DEPSECDEF
David Packard's memo mentioned earlier. Thus, the Blue
Ribbon Panel was essentially confirming established DOD
policy, which preceded it several months earlier.
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4. Acquisition Strategy in DODD 5000.1 of 13 July 1971
(1971-1976)
This was a new and refreshing policy approach on the
acquisition of major systems. The first point of signifi-
cance was that the policy directive governing the acquisition
of major systems decreased from 16 to 6 pages. Then Deputy
Secretary of Defense Packard intended the following changes
to occur as a result of this directive:
-Decentralization of dec is ion-making from the OSD
to the Service Component level.
-Clarification and delineation of authority and
responsibility for key organizations and individuals
involved in the acquisition process.
-Definition of the SECDEF milestone decision points
and the enumeration of the substantiating elements
that support each SECDEF decision.
The first and second objectives were meant to be achieved
through redefinition of the authority and responsibilities
of the formulators and implementers we have described. The
Secretary of Defense would retain the decision-making author-
ity for initiating new programs and redirecting existing
programs. The DSARC would support the SECDEF decision-making
and need formulation process.
OSD would retain formulation and overview responsi-
bilities that include establishing acquisition policy, assur-
ing that major defense systems were pursued in response to
valid needs, and evaluating policy implementation on each
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approved program. Program monitoring would be the joint
responsibility of OSD and the Service Component as defined
in this directive.
The Service components were defined to have a role
in formulation which was limited to identification of valid
needs. However, they were to have a larger role in program
implementation consisting of the definition, development
and production of systems to satisfy those needs when
approval was given by SECDEF . This directive did state a
subtle split inside Service Component responsibilities. The
identification of valid needs and the definition of require-
ments were to be assigned to the Assistant Service Secretary
for R&D. The responsibility for the development and produc-
tion phases were assigned to the designated Program Manager.
The intent of policy-makers in DODD 5000.1 from our perspec-
tive was to separate the program manager from formulation
responsibilities and recognize his role as program implementer
There was a weakness in policy application, and it occurred
at the interface of need formulation and program implementa-
tion. In real life there was a disconnect between the two
processes. The "front end" formulators often did not include
considerations that would "vitally" affect program implementa-
tion. The program manager was ineffective in dealing with
many of those problems because they were incapable of being
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solved by traditional program management tools of contracting,
management control systems, etc.
Overall coordination was to be achieved through OSD
overview in the DSARC process. "Mr. Packard's" directive
established the three key milestones in this process. These
program milestones consisted of the Program Initiation De-
cision, the Full Scale Development Decision and the Production
Decision as transition points where SECDEF should have in-
creased visibility. Figure 13 represents the weapons develop-
ment cycle based on the above concepts and as defined in this
directive.
Each of the phases leading to a DSARC decision point
had to demonstrate a valid need and an acquisition strategy
for obtaining the requirement to fulfill the need. The
acquisition strategy was to be documented in the DCP and
would consist of, "The considerations which support the
determination of the need for a system program, together
with a plan for that program..." (11) A complete description
of the content and the objectives of the DCP are listed in
Appendix B. A summary of the major contributions of "Mr.
Packard's" directive would include the following:
a. Establishment of three major decision points
in each program for the SECDEF to reassess mission needs,





















































o CO wM M 1 SM H hJ PM
< H-l o
CJ M £> H-l
Pi H fe H
< M >
CO S3 Pn WQ H o Q
S
oM S3H 2 H O
CJ s M CO
Pi CJ H M
< O M CJ
CO Pi S3 WQ P-. H p
Jh h
pi feO w
Q <d PhPi o
<-3 O tJ
• Pi hJ w
•u Ph >
W 5-1 X w




























ready for approval of additional funds commitment to proceed
into the next phase.
b. Clearly defining SECDEF , OSD , Service Component,
and Program Manager responsibility in the weapon acquisition
process. (Implementation of the intent of this policy point;
however, has not occurred in real life. The program manager
is still faced by staff layering, many meaningless staff
review briefings and reporting requirements.)
c. Recognition of the program manager's role in
carrying out acquisition policy, managing the program, and
meeting its objectives.
d. Recognition that an implementation plan was
needed by the PM to carry out program objectives as estab-
lished by the Services and approved by SECDEF. This was the
"acquisition strategy," and the Program Manager was responsi-
ble for its development at program initiation.
The implicit meaning of acquisition strategy as used
in this directive was not clear. Four years later DODD
5000.2 made an attempt at clarifying terminology by expanding
the scope of DODD 5000.1 and defining many of the elements
listed under each decision point. New terms appeared such
as "program plan," "contractual plan," but acquisition
strategy was left open to interpretation.
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5. Contribution of the Commission on Government Procure -
ment to the Major Weapon Systems Acquisition Process
(1972)
The previously mentioned problems in the acquisition
of major systems persisted with no apparent solutions in
sight even with the numerous attempts to bring about change.
The following statement is illustrative of the frustrations
expressed by Congress.
"The need to improve major system acquisition has
been made apparent by the succession of cost overruns,
contract claims, contested awards, buy-ins, bail-outs,
and defective systems that have drawn sharp criticism
to one or more programs in recent years. The clutter
of programs and problems has made it difficult to under-
stand or grapple with the underlying causes of acquisi-
tion difficulties, some of which are subtly removed
from time and place that the symptoms appear.
...too many past attempts have tried to deal with
the symptomatic problems, such as those just enumerated,
on an individual piecemeal basis. Patchwork corrective
action has become counterproductive, leading to more
regulations to amend regulations, more people to check
people, more procedures to correct procedures, and more
organizations to correct organization problems." (19)
Therefore, unlike many of the past studies* that
were constrained to deal with segments of the major systems
acquisition process, an exceedingly broad charter was given
to the Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) by
Congress. This broad charter allowed the Commission to take
*A chronological list of DOD management studies dealing with
various aspects of the acquisition process during the past
30 years are summarized in Appendix D.
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an integrated view of the deficiencies in major systems
acquisition and identify the consequential problems (such
as those described in the above quote from the COGP report)
that surface in program implementation and relate them to
actions or inactions of the earlier formulation phase. The
Commission's analyses resulted in 12 recommendations for
improving both the formulation and implementation phases of
major systems acquisition. The complete list of the 12
recommendations of the COGP are presented in Appendix C.
These recommendations indicate that a "systems approach" is
needed to improve the acquisition process for major systems.
The framework of this systems approach is presented
in Figure 14. This Figure clearly defines the recommended
roles and responsibilities that must be assumed by formulators
and implementers at each policy level and depicts how formu-
lation, as we previously described in Figure 5, is inseparably
linked to program implementation. Each numbered action in
the diagram correlates with the corresponding COGP recommen-
dation in Appendix C. It must be emphasized that neither
the problems, as identified by the COGP, nor its recommenda-
tions, can be viewed or intended to be applied separately,
selectively, or incrementally.
In procedural terms, the Commission's aim was to













the acquisition process. These were:
-Establishing a common framework that highlights the
key decisions for all involved organizations—Congress
,
agency heads, service components, and the private
sector for the purpose of having a common set of pro-
cedures for initiating, conducting, and controlling
programs
.
-Defining the role each organization is to play in
order to exercise its proper level of responsibility
and control over acquisition programs.
-Giving visibility to Congress and agency heads to
exercise their responsibilities by providing them
with the information needed to make key program
decisions and commitments.
-Improving the means for assuring public accountability
as a substitute for the burden of present administra-
tive reporting and surveillance procedures.
Some of the broad existing problem areas analyzed by
the Commission are presented in Column 1 of Table 1; Column
2 lists the current DOD approach, based on the policy in
DODD 5000.1, for solving those problems. The third column
summarizes the major changes recommended by the Commission's
report, many of which not only support current DOD policy,
but also extend to the fundamentals of the acquisition pro-
cess not previously addressed in DOD policy.
In a broader context, the Commission's 12 recommenda-
tions present an acquisition strategy framework which unifies
formulation and implementation in weapons acquisition. There
was a recognition in DODD 5000.1 that ..."It is crucial that
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wrong decisions create problems not easily overcome later in
the program." (11) However, there was no coherent acquisition
strategy framework to assure that the formulation process
would interface with program implementation. For the most
part formulation was the driving factor on all programs, and
in many instances great difficulties were imposed on program
implementation because "impossible" schedule or mission capa-
bility parameters were established early in the formulation
phase.
It is the authors ' belief that the COGP report and
its recommendations provide a new way of understanding and
viewing the acquisition of major systems. This new concept
is, what we term, the unified acquisition strategy that is
articulated by the Commission's report; it is a "systems
approach" that integrates both formulation and implementation.
A further discussion dealing with the application of
the acquisition strategy framework contained in the COGP
recommendations will be deferred until the last section in
this chapter which will discuss OMB Circular A-109, the
policy implementation document for the COGP recommendations.
6. AMARC, NMARC, and Project ACE Studies (1974-1975)
After the Commission of Government Procurement report,
the above three studies were conducted by the Army, Navy, and
Air Force, respectively. Each report analyzed and critiqued
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the problems associated with the acquisition process within
each service and provided recommendations for improvement.
None of the above three studies identified any problems
that were significantly different from those noted in the
COGP report, or in the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report.
Collectively these three studies could be viewed as a reac-
tion to the COGP report rather than as independent studies
dealing with the acquisition of major systems. Consequently,
it is not surprising that many of the recommendations and
conclusions reached in these three reports are identical in
concept and content as those in the COGP. The authors will
not attempt to cover all the recommendations and conclusions
of the NMARC, AMARC, and Project ACE studies; only the
identification of significant insights or major differences
from the COGP report will be presented. The points of
significance identified from the analysis of these studies
are as follows:
a. Identification of mission needs and deficiencies.
The AMARC study made a "startling" revelation and
it also applies equally to the Navy and the Air Force. AMARC
acknowledged that
"...the lack of a complete definition of a requirement
specifically oriented to a mission deficiency is the
biggest contributor to criticism of the acquisition
process. The term 'mission deficiency' refers to a
broad mission area and the ability of the Army to
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totally perform that mission. The fulfillment of a
mission deficiency may require more than one weapon
system. It may require a change not only in weapons
systems but also in doctrine, tactics, and force
structure. The functional alignments contained in the
Department of the Army staff reorganization as yet do
not clearly define responsibilities associated with
the delineation of mission deficiencies." (23)
This implies that in order for the Services to perform their
formulation roles and to comply with COGP recommendation 1(a)
,
it will be necessary for each Service to reorganize/realign
its operations and planning staffs from the current hardware
system concept to a mission area basis. Unless the other two
Services acknowledge this problem as the AMARC study did for
the Army, it is our belief that the Navy and Air Force will
continue to experience a great deal of difficulty in the
formulation of future needs in terms of mission deficiencies.
The current formulators in the Services can only identify
deficiencies in terms of a given hardware system because of
the organizational constraints. For example, in the Navy
DCNO (OP-02) Submarine Warfare, DCNO (OP-03) Surface Warfare,
and, DCNO (OP-05) Air Warfare are platform advocates rather
than mission sponsors because of the current organizational
framework.
b. Role of the Program Manager as Implementer
In 1969, the Logistics Management Institute (LMI)
noted that higher authority called upon project managers and
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their key subordinates to engage in tasks which did not lie
within their charter, knowledge, or expertise. Primary
among such tasks mentioned was justification of the total
program. "Project managers believe that higher authority
should present and defend the programs to OSD, OMB, Congress
and the public. They believe such activity is not a proper
role of project people, who should be left to run the pro-
ject." (26)
Program managers, in the current environment,
devote considerable time and effort preparing for and testi-
fying at Congressional hearings pertaining to their programs
This should be part of the formulator's rather than the
implementer ' s role. AMARC concurred in the above assessment
and delineated the difference between the formulation role
and the implementation role by affirming that "...the pro-
gram manager should be involved in such matters when the
subject concerns the management as opposed to the defense ,
of the program. It is someone else's job to defend the
program at higher levels of authority within the DOD and
before Congressional committees. Project managers should
be allowed to manage their programs. Their military and




NMARC and Project ACE were not able to make the
above distinction; however, these two studies classified
the above problem as part of the broader problem of OSD staff
"layering." Nevertheless, the implication was that the pro-
gram manager's responsibilities should focus on meeting the
program objectives, and management of the program; program
justification should fall under the responsibility of a
formulator at a level above the program manager.
c. Acquisition Strategy- -An Implementation Framework
to Carry Out Program Objectives
All three studies indicate that there is a lack
of realistic and thorough planning for system acquisition.
Although DODD 5000.2 contains a recommended framework and
lists the considerations that should be included in an
acquisition strategy (see Appendix B) . However, "There
seems to be no substantial evidence or assurance that such
strategy and plans are developed by a PM supported by experts
knowledgeable in all functional areas including operations,
requirements, procurement, production, costing, logistical
support, equipment technology, or industrial inputs." (24)
Of the three studies, AMARC shows the clearest
understanding of and similarity to our concept of acquisi-
tion strategy. The development "...of a detailed 'acquisi-
tion strategy' for individual systems or programs prior to
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program initiation is the single most important factor in
establishing a weapon system acquisition program. 'Acquisi-
tion strategy, ' as used herein, refers to a mutually supporting
series of plans for translating the goals and management needs
of the total life of a specific program into a series of inter-
related actions to accomplish the program. The purpose of
an acquisition strategy is not to gain approval to initiate
a program, but to establish a foundation through a series of
plans upon which the acquisition and logistical support of
weapon systems can be accomplished." (23)
It is important to note from the above definition
that acquisition strategy is to be developed after the approval
for the initiation of a program is given by OSD, and there-
fore it should be concerned with implementation, achieving
DOD management goals and program objectives within the
resource constraints of the FYDP. It should also be noted
from the above definition that the acquisition strategy is
not to be inferred as necessarily being a document or a
checklist with time phased actions. A rigid plan or paper
document can only lead to problems as a PM tries to "stick
to an approved plan" and at the same time accomodate changes
in needs
,
goals , schedules , and funding levels . There is
ample evidence of the problems caused by inflexibility in
program implementation under DODD 3200.9 which tried to
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force each program into a rigid framework with predetermined
contracting techniques. The task of developing a sound
acquisition strategy must be vested in the program manager
who has the responsibility of managing the program and carry-
ing out its objectives. He must be the one to structure the
acquisition strategy for his own program for the total devel-
opment cycle from the initial design through production. It
is an inevitable fact that changes dictated by formulators
will take place during the course of the program. This is
when the full value of an acquisition strategy will be real-
ized. It will allow the program manager to assess the impact
of the formulator directed changes and provide him a frame-
work to minimize the effects on the program.
The basic thrust of the three studies is to re-
affirm the guidelines for acquisition strategy in DODD 5000.1
and 5000.2, and the need for continuing effort within the
Services to amplify and perfect the principles therein.
7. Acquisition Advisory Group (AAG) Report (1975)
Shortly after the completion of AMARC, NMARC, and
Project ACE, the AAG was established. Its scope was not
meant to cover the total acquisition process but was limited
to weapon system management activities at OSD and Service
levels including the OSD/Service interfaces over the life
cycle of a system. Specific points of analysis by the AAG
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were COGP recommendations 1, 2, 11, and 12. The most sig-
nificant AAG conclusions with respect to the formulation
and implementation of acquisition strategy will be presented
below.
a. Formulation of Mission Needs
The AAG takes issue with the COGP recommenda-
tion 1, the portion that deals with the start of new pro-
grams with an agency head statement of needs and goals.
It is clearly against the direct interjection of SECDEF at
this point in the formulation of requirements.
"It would not be useful and could be counterpro-
ductive if OSD were to institutionalize, review and
approve all of the 'requirements' documents which are
generated and harbored within the Services prior to
the time when major advanced or engineering develop-
ment programs are proposed to meet the requirement." (10)
Similarly it is against the use of the DSARC
process, DSARC "0", for the initial need statement or the
involvement of DSARC principles in that activity. This may
in part reflect the AAG's fear of the possibility toward
greater centralization of authority in OSD with their earlier
direct involvement in the determination of mission needs.
Instead, AAG proposes that the SECDEF establish broad
mission areas through agreements with the services and allow
them to pursue the definition of needs on their own initia-
tive through mission area analyses and mission concept
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studies. The SECDEF would still formally document approval
or disapproval of Service recommended mission needs arising
from the mission area/concept studies. Up to this point it
would appear that AAG is recommending a reduction in central-
ization and layering, as it does throughout the report. How-
ever, a contradiction is evident when the AAG proposes to
interject another OSD layer in the formulation process.
"To assist the SECDEF in overseeing this 'front
end' activity, it is suggested that a disinterested
third party staff group such as the Weapons System
Evaluation Group (WSEG) be charged with this
responsibility." (10)
The Director of WSEG would ensure that the indi-
vidual Service needs are coordinated on a DOD-wide basis,
this individual would report to the DEPSECDEF.
b. Acquisition Executive
The AAG recommended the establishment of an
acquisition executive to eliminate the previously identified
conflicting staff /line relationships. With one individual
serving as the DSARC Chairman at all times, the layering
and staff/line ambiguities of having both DDR&E and ASD(I&L)
involved at different decision points would be resolved.
This would also tend to unify the technical and business
strategy, which up till now have been relatively isolated




c. Rejustification/Reverification of Needs During
the DSARC Process
The AAG takes issue with the requirement for the
program manager having to reverify the need at each DSARC
decision point. The AAG goes on to imply that this should
not be the role of an individual who is the implementer and
is assigned to carry out program objectives; it should be
the responsibility of individuals who are primarily formu-
lators in the weapons acquisition cycle.
"In most instances the program manager and his
supporting program office are neither well qualified
nor responsible for justifying the need or require-
ment for his program. On the other hand, they are
primarily responsible for cost, performance, and
schedule trade-offs with a given system. Overall
justification of the need for a specific new system
is a Service Headquarters and OSD function with
advice and counsel from JCS and DIA." (10)
This reaffirms the continuing unresolved problem
in DOD of not having responsibilities clearly spelled out
for the program manager and for OSD policy formulators in-
volved in various aspects of system acquisition.
d. The Impact of AAG on Acquisition Policy
The problems that AAG identified have all been
noted in previous studies, and its recommendations are not
"different" or new. It is the authors' belief that the
major contribution to acquisition policy by AAG is its
attempt to consolidate the individual Service perceptions
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of problems relating to OSD-Service interface in systems
acquisition into singular recommendations for SECDEF review,
analysis, and action. However these problems will have to
be worked out jointly through the efforts of both OSD and
the Services to realize any improvement. The other areas
addressed by the AAG report are in relatively close conform-
ance with COGP recommendations 2, 11, and 12, and will
therefore not be repeated.
8. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109 (1976)
a. A Unified Need Formulation/Program Implementation
Framework
Circular A-109 represents the culmination of 20
years of policy evolution concerning the acquisition of
major weapons systems and provides the guidance for the
establishment of a common framework for policy formulation
and program implementation to all Executive Agencies. It is
unanimously consistent with the 12 recommendations of the
COGP. The individual recommendations as proposed in COGP
and as incorporated in A-109 do not seem basically new or
startling. Their overall goal is to eliminate the persistent
problems commonly associated with the acquisition of major
systems. What is different, is the integrated framework
which unifies the formulation of needs with program imple-
mentation. The A-109 framework, as promulgated, is built
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on four cornerstone objectives, each one contributing to
the others.
"-To clarify roles and responsibilities of
industry, agency components, agency top management
and the Congress so that each can perform its logi-
cal role in systems acquisition under our desired
economic and political systems.
-To structure new programs according to basic
steps in problem solving that would separate a need
from its solution, encourage research along several
paths, and introduce early, meaningful competition
into the acquisition process.
-To give agency top management and the Congress
the visibility over crucial turning points that
shape program purpose and direction.
-To assure better public accountability with
fewer government controls by timely visibility on
key decisions and restoring the government -industry
contractual relationship to one based on real com-
petition, thereby placing less reliance on costly
and burdensome administrative controls and
requirements." (27)
The essence of the first cornerstone was to de-
fine the roles and responsibilities for the formulators and
the implementers involved in systems acquisition. The
source of recurring problems has been that these roles were
often reversed and the responsibilities for key decisions
were organizationally misplaced and poorly timed. Further,
design responsibilities for new systems were diffused or
totally absent.
The second cornerstone represents the coor-
dination of need formulation and program implementation
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through the four problem solving steps derived from COGP
:
1. Establishing needs and goals
2. Exploring alternate systems
3. Choosing the preferred approach
4. Final development, production and use.
The above are graphically depicted in Figure 15; it is a
macroview of the major system acquisition cycle based on
the A-109 concept.
The third cornerstone provides visibility to
top formulators and provides the information necessary for
them to exercise their responsibilities at these key
milestones
:
-when first determining needs and goals;
-when initiating competitive systems demonstration;
-when choosing the preferred system(s) for full
scale development; and
-when entering production.
Figure 15 also depicts where in the acquisition cycle these
decision points would occur.
The fourth cornerstone objective of A-109 was
to establish accountability in the acquisition process. Past
policymakers have tried to solve the accountability issue
with more management controls, more reporting systems, and































these attempts have been unsuccessful. The concept of
competition inherent in the A -109 framework coupled with
the visibility for the top formulators is designed to elimin-
ate the need for the many controls and regulations and will
establish the desired accountability.
Up until now we have tried to provide a histori-
cal perspective of the major contributing policy documents
that led up to A-109, with sidelights on their failings to
deal with the real problems in the acquisition process. The
COGP was the first study to analyze the acquisition process
using an integrated systems approach; A-109 provides the
implementation framework for the systems approach by building
on the concept of the above four objectives. An explanation
of how the A-109 framework is meant to be applied will be
presented below.
Refer again to Figure 15, which presents the macrc
view of the life cycle of a major weapon system under the
A-109 concept. Milestone "0" is the first key decision in
this cycle and is designated by circle 1. There are activi-
ties that precede Milestone "0"; Mission analysis and the
evaluation and reconciliation of needs in context of agency
mission, resources and priorities. However, these two were
discussed earlier in the context of Phase 1 and Phase 2 of
the formulation process in Figure 3 and won't be repeated
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at this point. Approval of the mission need starts the
major system acquisition process by granting authority to
explore alternative system design concepts. The mission
need statement includes the mission purpose, capability, time
constraints, value of meeting the need, relative priority,
and operating constraints; it is not to be expressed in terms
of specific equipment or hardware which might satisfy the
need.
Several important events are initiated or take
place shortly after Milestone "0" in the A-109 framework.
The need must be communicated to Congress as part of the
budget process, in order to permit Congress to consider the
need within the context of overall national priorities of
other programs and needs. This step is consistent with the
previously summarized objectives which include involving
Congress in its proper role of formulation by providing
visibility to Congress before the commitment of major re-
sources and selection of solutions. It also establishes
accountability at program inception.
This is also the point at which A-109 proposes
to bring in the program manager. His prime purpose at this
point would be to initiate program implementation. Program
implementation activities at this point would be directed
at assembling a program team and initiating acquisition
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strategy from the implementer ' s vice the formulator's per-
spective. This acquisition strategy should form the basis
for the program manager's system implementation plan. He
will use this plan to communicate with higher level formula-
tors, his management team, interfacing OSD and Service
functional groups, and with industry. The acquisition
strategy should encompass the entire program implementation
phase with emphasis on the near term time phased actions. As
the program proceeds and periodic reviews are made, the next
increment of near term considerations would be emphasized.
Such an approach, implicit in A-109, would minimize the
planning burden and provide a basis for program direction
and for measurement of success against program goals and
objectives. At program initiation, it is neither possible
nor desirable to address all considerations in detail. It
is possible and desirable, however, to examine and schedule
when decisions on each consideration can and must be made
throughout the acquisition process and to refine the strategy
planning as the program proceeds.
However, it must also be realized that there may
be very little a program manager can do at Milestone "0"
toward the development of an acquisition strategy. A more
likely role would be his involvement in providing support to
a higher level formulator. This is because the identification
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of a mission need may involve considerations that affect
more than one existing weapon system, it may involve a change
in doctrine, Service manning levels, force structures, etc.
These are areas where an implementer would lack authority
to effect changes. It is visualized that the Program Manager
would be providing support to a higher level formulator,
possibly a Mission Manager during this phase, who would have
the authority to coordinate actions in these different areas.
After the Milestone "0" decision, the acquisition
strategy would focus on obtaining meaningful competition by
soliciting industry on a wide basis to develop alternative
system concepts. Figure 16 presents a proposed framework
for exploring alternative systems concepts and is directly
related to the previous figure. The methodology illustrated
by Figure 16 would be to issue an RFQ with the widest possible
dissemination; both, large known producers and small con-
tractors would be solicited. The main purpose at this stage
would be to obtain a wide range of ideas and innovative
systems approach concepts. The emphasis would not be on
system details, government specifications nor for a pre-
scribed hardware solution. Evaluation would be done by an
in-house team of technical specialists or through the
assistance of Government labs. After evaluating each of the
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the superior system concepts would be provided funding
through short term parallel contracts to refine their own
separate approaches and develop the following:
-A set of system functional requirements.
-System parameters and constraints.
-Criteria to determine responsiveness of system
design concepts to meet the mission need.
-Feasibility analysis to demonstrate that the
proposed system concept is within the state-
of-the-art, within the framework of resource
capabilities, and realizable in terms of
allocated budget and in terms of schedule.
The output of this state, coupled with a re-
assessment of the threat, and reaffirmation of the need,
would be the basis for making the DSARC I decision to pro-
ceed into the Competitive Demonstration Phase or into
Validation in the current erminology. This is the second
key decision (Circle 2, Figure 15). Also, at this point,
further analysis and evaluation would be performed to deter-
mine which of the competing systems approaches merit funding
for competitive demonstrations.
Competitive demonstrations are intended to verify
that the chosen concepts are sound, perform in an operational
environment, and provide a basis for selection of the system
design concept(s) to be continued into full-scale development,
Such demonstrations normally involve some type of prototypes;
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these may range from a principal end item or critical sub-
system, to a limited and less than complete development
model. The winning concept (s) and contractor(s) of the
demonstration evaluation may then move into full-scale
development and initial production.
By now a definite pattern can be seen emerging
in the progression of a program through the weapons system
acquisition process. The pattern is keyed to the DSARC
decision points, which reaffirm mission need, program objec-
tives, risk; etc., at each milestone. From program incep-
tion to the production decision genuine alternatives exist
in system concepts. Each contractor carries his own unique
concept through the competition leading to the production
award. The number of alternatives are narrowed at each
decision point by elimination of non-feasible or ineffective
systems approaches. Successful contractors are funded
through parallel short term contracts to refine their own
"unique" concepts for the next stage of demonstration,
testing, and evaluation. Evaluation of these systems concepts
are based on actual testing and demonstrations of mock-ups,
breadboard models, and fully operational prototypes, depend-
ing on the stage of the program in the development cycle.
The final stage leading to the production award can be based
on a "fly-off," if feasible, with due consideration given
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to life cycle program cost. The production decision makes
the final elimination among the remaining competitors to
choose the system which "best" meets the mission need within
overall life cycle cost considerations. Figure 17 presents
a graphic view of the major system acquisition process as
outlined above using the framework of A-109.
b. Impact of A-109
Although A-109 has not been fully implemented
in practice by DOD, recent revisions have been made to up-
date DODD 5000.1 and 5000.2 so that they conform to the in-
tent of A-109. Therefore, certain valid assumptions can
be made about the probable impact of these changes on the
acquisition process for major systems. Some of the more
significant ones will be discussed below.
(1) Elimination of the Symptomatic Problems .
Many of the symptomatic and persistent problems commonly
associated with the acquisition process should be eliminated
by implementation of the A-109 framework. A listing of the
problems and the rationale for A-109 's impact in eliminating



































Impact of the A-109
Agency will oversee pro-
grams at crucial turning
points; rely on competi-
tion, test demonstrations
and fixed-price contract-






the outset, such require-
ments will result from a
competitive development
effort oriented to needed
mission functions and
program goals.
Contractors will have the




posals will be precluded;







sign will be procured
directly by him from the
source.
Short steps in the initial
program phase, focused on













Profits will not be solely
cost-based, but rather
will depend more on the
results of competition.
Higher profits will accrue
from innovative simpler,
lower cost solutions to











rely principally on com-
petitive forces, test
demonstrations and visi-
bility on key program
decisions, unless program
is sole source. Agency
components will have full
flexibility to explore
system alternatives.
Overall, a simplified and
flexible decisionmaking
process is called for
that places greater reli-
ance on sound judgment







Cost growth will continue
to occur but large unan-
ticipated growth will be
precluded by no longer
specifying premature sys-
tem requirements, by short
risk reduction steps in
the initial program phase,
by higher confidence in-
formation acquired for de-
cisions and by reduced
emphasis on initial system








Impact of the A- 109
Large claims are unlikely
because (1) the Government
will not make design de-
cisions or impose commer-
cially impractical system
requirements at the be-
ginning of development
and (2) higher confidence
information developed in










be important criteria in
evaluating alternatives
to be explored and in
choosing the preferred
system; test demonstrations
will yield information for
final choice and undue





within the reach of pro-
gram cost goals and at
quantities needed to per-
form the agency function
will be explored and sus-
tained. Criteria used for
system choice will compare
competing alternatives as
to the cost to acquire,
operate and maintain in
the field.
Congressional un-




Congress will have the
opportunity to affirm pro-
gram need at the outset






Source Symptomatic Problem Impact of the A-109
not be asked to fund
program implementations
until system performance
and cost can be reasonably-





(2) Acquisition Executive . Neither DOD nor
the Service components have had an acquisition executive.
Presently the responsibility for making policy and monitor-
ing acquisition programs is split between the technical and
business functions at top DOD and individual Service levels.
This split in authority between the R&D and procurement
policy staff functions makes it difficult to integrate
technical and business management planning, correlate changes
in acquisition policies, monitor implementation of the
separate policies, or determine the ultimate results of the
policies.
As part of his responsibility for the early
phases of major system acquisition programs, DDR&E develops
overall acquisition policies; these are expressed in DODD
5000.1, DODD 5000.2, DODD 5000.3, etc. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense (I&L) also issues policy in the form
of ASPR regulations. These regulations set policy for all
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DOD procurement including some aspects of major system con-
tracting. This situation illustrates that the acquisition
policy for program implementation was split between ASPR and
DOD directives. Similarly the split exists in the monitoring
and the DSARC decision process. DDR&E chairs DSARC I and II
and ASD(I&L) is the chairman of DSARC III. As a result of
this split, not only does the problem of discontinuity exist
but also it is evidenced in the duplication of responsibilities,
layering and management overstaffing which occur below the
top levels of DOD and Service components.
The recent establishment of an acquisition
executive in DOD to have overall responsibility for acquisi-
tion policy was directed by A-109. Future policy from busi-
ness and technical policy formulators will have to be
coordinated through the acquisition executive. This should





A. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION PRESENTED
The concept of acquisition strategy which has been ex-
pressed thus far has assumed that it is possible for a
rational, conscious and deliberate process of decision
making to govern the acquisition of major weapon systems
within the Department of Defense. Our use of the principals
of the field of study of corporate strategy /corporate policy
in the development of our concept itself implies the presence
of a general manager with an overall, organizational, per-
spective. The general manager, not the process per se, is
the element lending rationality, consciousness and deliberat-
ness to decision making. It is then, the general manager, or
in our context, the acquisition manager, who must learn to
guide the acquisition process rather than becoming its slave.
We believe ample evidence exists which confirms that no
policy or procedure can be developed which is so comprehensive
or fool proof as to render the art of decision making obsolete
The process of acquisition of major weapon systems has never
been considered to be well developed or well defined. It has
never proved to be fully capable of delivering weapons which
consistently meet performance, schedule, and cost constraints.
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Attempts to improve the acquisition process by adding
organization, rationality, and farsightedness have been
discussed earlier, for example, the contributions of DODD
3200.9, the Blue Ribbon Panel, and the AAG. Many of such
attempts to critically appraise the system have been in
reality, attempts to isolate specific procedural disconnects
within the acquisition process and make recommendations for
instant success. Few dramatic achievements have been real-
ized. Even the contribution of the Commission on Government
Procurement, the most comprehensive of all studies, cannot
be ascertained at this time since many of the recommenda-
tions are only now being implemented. Our research would
predict success when the recommendations are fully imple-
mented due to the overall approach taken by the Commission.
When the acquisition process is viewed from an historical
perspective, the major works which describe acquisition
problems in each of the last three decades point out nearly
identical manifestations of existing problems. Cost over-
runs, gold-plating, inadequate performance achievement, in-
adequately trained personnel, and continued personnel
shortages are universally discussed. The absence of strong
centralized decision making in the 1950' s, the presence of
centralized decision making in the early and late 1960 's
coupled with the "new management" tools, such as total
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package procurement, and fixed price incentive contracting,
and the return to decentralized decision making in the late
1960 's and early 1970' s has not aleviated the basic and re-
current problems pointed out by both Peck and Scherer (8)
and Fox (9)
.
The evidence would seem to suggest that try as we may,
the acquisition of major weapon systems is a process which
is either not well enough understood or of such a nature as
not to be controllable by men. Contrary to intuition, there
is also evidence that while most of the problems so fre-
quently identified by outsiders, to the system, are real,
those operating within the system are on the whole quite
content to simply accept their insolubility. Comments such
as "lets face it, that idea will never work, we've tried it
before," and "that new procedure you just described, well,
we already do it that way" are comments often heard from
professional acquisition specialists at all levels when
faced with new or innovative techniques. There is almost
what can be described as a protective response prevalent in
acquisition circles, a response which attempts to justify
the existing system no matter how inadequate and wasteful
it may be. It appears that in the acquisition process,
familiarity does not breed contempt.
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There is an overwhelming resistence to change within
the Department of Defense. Such resistence cannot be simply
attributed to personal shortsightedness of past and current
practitioners within the acquisition process. The sprawling
size and complexity of the Department of Defense fractionates
decision making and creates so called empires. The existence
of these "fiefdoms" adds to the resistence to change through
the creation of individual office procedures or protocols
where the protective response described earlier is most
intense. The concept of acquisition strategy which we
espouse does not require an explicit change in procedure,
policy or structure. We suggest rather, that a change in
thinking, a new mentality regarding the acquisition process,
is necessary. If organizational or structural changes can
contribute to improvement in the acquisition process, it is
only after a new mentality is developed, that such change
can be considered.
It was noted earlier that the acquisition manager must
be a generalist. Acquiring the perspective of a generalist
implies elimination of long standing personal ties to one
functional specialty or another, and acquiring a higher order
dedication to efficient acquisition planning. To be more
specific, for example within the Navy, we would advocate that
Force and Mission Sponsors become solely mission sponsors.
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In doing so, they would become mission specialists, and
therefore broadly speaking functional specialists. However,
they would become functional specialists of a higher order.
Thus, the inherent platform orientation which these specific
officers bring with them can only be a burden to the success-
ful accomplishment of their mission. Such a shift in men-
tality would entail elimination of deep seated affiliation
with platform types and in some respects would require
severing ties with ones "community" of fellow officers.
The mission area, thus would become the object for optimiza-
tion rather than the platform type. Parenthetically, it is
noted, that the newest development in the acquisition process
the requirement for mission area budgeting, must be incor-
porated in future acquisition strategy formulation. The
mission orientation, just discussed can only facilitate
the transition to this new policy.
The Mission Sponsor, whom we will refer to as the
Mission Manager would depend on a number of program managers
to counter mission area deficiencies. Each program manager
would be responsible for product management rather than con-
tinued substantiation of needs or requirements. Such respon-
sibility would be returned to the Mission Manager who has a




The Mission Manager would also serve as a point for
decisions required to be made prior to the assignment of a
program manager. Once assigned, the program manager can
then dedicate his full attention to the development of a
weapon system. He will no longer be required to divide his
time among the various activities required to continually
justify the continuance of his program. The proper time
for assignment of the program manager would then be, in
accordance with our concept of acquisition strategy during
the time period between Milestone "0" and DSARC I. The
most opportune point would seem to be when the process of
formulation, in the moving balance which exists between
phases, gives way to a predominance of the implementation
phase. Clearly, the program manager would be most effective
at a time when formulation has been formalized and alterna-
tive product or hardware solutions actually are being
considered.
Our concept of acquisition strategy identifies the per-
iod bounded by Milestone "0" and DSARC I as the most critical
period in the acquisition process due to the high degree of
mixing of the two phases at that time. It is therefore
suggested that future research be directed toward in depth
analysis of the mechanisms at work during that transition or
overlap period. Many of the untoward results which can be
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attributed to poor coordination during that transition
period may possibly be eliminated, or mechanisms for control
be developed, by additional research.
The concept of acquisition strategy developed in the
thesis can be viewed as an integrating mechanism which can
lend coordination to the widely dispersed activities which
exist in the acquisition process. Acquisition strategy is
not a new procedure or policy to be added to an intolerably
long list which already exists. It advocates a new way of
thinking about the acquisition process, it provides a con-
ceptual matrix or index, the use of which may aid in re-
vealing the intense and complicated relationships which
exist amongst the players of the "acquisition game."
B . EPILOGUE
The reader, after having been led through a complete
evolution of policy directives and studies of the major
system acquisition process, may wonder, "Are we any closer
to understanding and solving problems of the 1950' s, most
of which are still with us today?"
We feel that the review of the historical perspective
was necessary to gain an appreciation for the well-intentioned
but unguided efforts of past policy-makers in trying to elim-




Attempts in the past have been to legislate, regulate,
over-control, overstaff, organize, and reorganize. The
result has been that directives, regulations, and controls
have grown voluminous, and procedures have become exceedingly
complex. More organizations were created to staff, manage,
and review every action of the Program Manager and industry
to assure policy compliance. The result has been that much
of the Program Manager's time and resources have been dissi-
pated in complying with reporting procedures and in pro-
viding a never-ending series of briefings to various
management levels within the Service component and to OSD
organizations. He has had correspondingly less time and
fewer resources to devote to the actual management of his
program. Patchwork procurement and contracting techniques
have been infused into the acquisition process with few
beneficial results. This list can be continued, but what
is presented should serve to illustrate to the reader that
he should now have a better understanding of the problems and
why past solutions didn't eliminate them, but actually created
additional, unforeseen problems of their own.
The reader may also wonder if the most recent major policy
document, OMB Circular A-109, is not just another directive




We contend this document is different from all past
policy. It demands that a new way of "thinking" be imple-
mented about the acquisition of major weapons; a new way
of thinking about the development of requirements , about
the nature of competition, about acquisition strategy, and
about accountability in the acquisition process. The value
of this document lies not necessarily in its procedures,
but in the basic framework as described in an earlier
section. Procedures will change with changes in formula-
tors and implementers . However, the basic framework, we
believe, will not change. This framework consisted of the
four cornerstones outlined below:
-Clear roles and responsibilities for Congress,
OSD, Service Components, and industry, so each
can perform its logical role in systems
acquisition.
-Development of an acquisition strategy which
separates the problem from the solution for new
programs and includes each of the formulation/
implementation steps of:
.Establishing needs and goals;
.Exploring alternatives;
.Choosing the preferred system; and
.Final development, production and use.
-Providing to formulators the needed visibility
over early decisions to shape program purpose
and direction.
-Restoration of public accountability through




This framework is the essence of our earlier discussion
which dealt from the theoretical perspective of formulation,
implementation and the integration of these two phases in
the weapons acquisition process.
The final question which remains to be answered is "Will
the problems be solved?" We believe that many of the symptom-
atic problems, as previously discussed, will be eliminated in
accordance with the rationale presented. We also realize
the potential practical difficulties involved in the imple-
mentation of this new evolutionary concept. It is not a
checklist, nor a "cookbook approach," it is a way of think-
ing. One of the major difficulties will be in educating both
the formulators and implementers . The acceptance of and
understanding of a new concept is typically met with bureau-
cratic inertia and resistence, no matter how great its
"inherent goodness." "We're already doing it" is the usual
response. It is also certain that new unforeseen problems
will evolve in the acquisition process as the full implemen-
tation of this concept progresses. However, now the frame-








Concept Formulation encompassed Exploratory and Advance
Development. It was the process preceding Engineering Devel-
opment whereby the validity and attainability of program was
established through comprehensive system and experimental
hardware studies. Evidence of validity and attainability
would be submitted for the approval of DDR&E in terms of six
prerequisites.* This evidence was submitted as part of a
Technical Development Plan (TDP) . Also submitted with the
TDP was a memorandum to DDR&E requesting approval to proceed
with full-scale development. (A Program Change Request (PCR)
was used in lieu of a memorandum if a PCR had not already
been forwarded to introduce the end item into the Five Year
Defense Program) . Approval was given by the Secretary of
Defense upon the recommendation of DDR&E. It is a conditional
approval to proceed with Engineering Development, the first
phase of which is Contract Definition.
The purpose of the Contract Definition phase (CD) was to
confirm this conditional approval through refinement of the
technical, cost, schedule, and management aspects of the pro-
gram. This phase consisted of three subphases and was
normally (but not necessarily) conducted by competing con-
tractors. Under certain conditions it was done on a non-
competitive basis or was even done in-house. Phase A was
the preparation and issuance of the Request for Proposal
(RFP) for the CD effort, and the selection of two or more
contractors to conduct the effort. Phase B was the actual
CD effort by the contractors and would not exceed six months,
1. Primarily engineering rather than experimental effort is
required, and the technology needed is sufficiently in hand,
2. The mission and performance envelopes are defined.
3. The best technical approaches have been selected.
4. A thorough trade-off analysis has been made.
5. The cost effectiveness of the proposed item has been deter-
mined to be favorable in relationship to the cost effec-
tiveness of competing items on a DOD-wide basis.




with three to four months being the norm. Phase C was the
evaluation and selection of the successful contractor for
Engineering Development, and this phase could not exceed
18 weeks. During the CD effort, the contractors developed
projections for the development effort and for the production
and operating phases as well. In some procurements the
successful CD contractor would be expected to undertake con-
tractual commitments for these phases, i.e. Total Package
Procurement. Upon completion of the CD effort, a contractor
was selected for the full-scale development effort, and
where a CD was required by the dollars involved, DDR&E




THE DECISION COORDINATING PAPER (DCP)
I. GENERAL
A. The DCP is a summary document of not more than 20
standard pages that provides management with the
essential information on a major defense system
program (DoD Directive 5000.1, reference (a)).
There will be a DCP for each major defense system
program. The DCP will also be used to accommodate
programs which represent major modifications to
existing deployed systems.
B. The form and content of each DCP issued shall focus
on the particular phase of the program it is intended
to support, related issues, and the specific decision
it seeks.
C. The "initial" draft DCP is a Military Service pre-
pared draft which after preliminary review within
the OSD becomes a "for comment" draft. This "for
comment" draft is forwarded to all interested groups
for review and comments. When revised to reflect
these comments it becomes the "for coordination"
draft which is used (1) as the basis for DSARC review,
(2) for final coordination, and (3) signature by
the DSARC Principals; the Deputy DDR&E (T&E) ; and
other appropriate signatories; and the Secretary of
Defense (see subsection III. A). The "for coordina-
tion" draft will be modified, if necessary to reflect
the Secretary of Defense decision prior to signature.
D. During the DCP coordination, key issues and the sub-
stance of disagreements shall be clearly defined.
While the coordination process will resolve many
major issues, it may not be possible to resolve all
issues. However, it is required that the unresolved
issues be clearly identified in the DCP. Conflicting
viewpoints shall be documented, supported and high-
lighted in the DCP.




E. Each DCP will identify any approved Area Coordinating
Paper (ACP) , or Mission Concept Paper (MCP) encom-
passing the specific mission area to which it relates.
F. Each DCP shall contain a Resource Annex. For each
program alternative in the DCP, this annex shall
specify Cost Data, Production Data, and Inventory/
Objectives Data using the same format as that employed
in the submission of Congressional Data Sheets, as
described in the Budget Guidance manual, DoD 7110-1-M.
The Annex will indicate, for each program alternative,
the required changes to previously allocated DoD com-
ponent resources and any changes to previous esti-
mates for the program.
G. The DCP will remain in existence throughout the
complete acquisition phase of a program. The DCP
shall be reviewed annually and updated as appropri-
ate (see subsection III.E.).
H. Cost escalation shall be handled in the DCP in the
same manner as in the Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR), prescribed by DoD Instruction 7000.3.
II. DCP OBJECTIVES
A. The basic objectives of each DCP, regardless of which
Secretary of Defense decision it supports, are to:
1. Ensure collaboration and essential debate by
DSARC Principals, and other key officials as
appropriate, before Secretary of Defense
decisions
.
2. Relate the phasing of the development and
acquisition program to force modernization
needs in the apporpriate mission area, utilizing
information on projected budgetary constraints
when possible.
3. Identify major issues or differences of opinion
that bear on the immediate Secretary of Defense
decision.
4. Identify and evaluate feasible program alterna-
tives based on their acquisition and ownership
costs and projected performance against the
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established need. Evaluations shall include
consideration of new development, improving
existing systems, and foreign developments.
5. Show how the program relates to similar pro-
grams in other Military Services and ensure
no unnecessary duplication.
6. Identify, and present a plan for the resolu-
tion of those issues and risks that are an-
ticipated during the next program phase.
7. Establish the plan, including test and evalua-
tion effort, for the next program phase (DoD
Directive 5000.3). Develop a fall-back plan
for an alternative program if objectives are
not achieved.
8. Define considerations of interoperability
with other force elements. This shall in-
clude a statement of the plan to address such
factors as electromagnetic compatibility and
identification needs when applicable.
9. Summarize the technical readiness of sub-
systems and the degree of standardization
including test and support equipment.
10. Establish cost, performance and schedule
thresholds for the total program and the
next program phase, including funding limits
for maintaining alternatives. Address the
estimated probability of producing and support-
ing the adequate number of systems within
realistic resource and time limitations.
11. Describe management responsibility, structure
and planned management systems
.
12. Establish objectives and limits of authority
that are delegated to the cognizant DoD Com-
ponent(s) for conducting the next phase of
the program.
13. Assure that the acquisition strategy and
related contract plan are consistent with
program characteristics, including risk.
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Assure that economic and technical competition
to the maximum extent feasible is planned.
14. Identify the environmental considerations as
required by DoD Directive 6050.1.
15. Identify impact of the proposed system program
on the utilization or expansion of DoD
facilities.
16. Ensure consideration of such international
aspects as buying foreign systems, joint
development programs, and sales to allied
countries
.
17. Identify the elements of the program that re-
quire protection by security classification.
18. Identify any document(s) that develop the
analytical rationale for force-level pro-
jections or goals.
B. Normally, the DCP I, which supports the decision by
the Secretary of Defense to enter the Program Valida-
tion Phase, will accommodate the basic objectives
above and place added emphasis on the following areas
1. Identify threat factors as analyzed in approp-
riate documents
.
2. Describe and substantiate the operational need.
3. Identify broad performance objectives; sub-
stantiate that these performance objectives meet
the operational need.
4. Identify the critical questions and areas of
risk to be resolved by test and evaluation and
provide a summary statement of test objectives,
schedules and milestones.
5. Identify preliminary cost and schedule estimates,
and identify design-to-cost goals or indicate
when these will be established.
6. Identify critical logistics support factors that
must be considered during the acquisition.
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7. Identify issues which must be resolved prior
to DSARC II and ensure that the program is
adequate to resolve them.
C. Normally, DCP II, which supports the decision by the
Secretary of Defense to enter the Full-Scale Engin-
eering Development Phase, will accommodate the basic
objectives above and place added emphasis on the
following areas:
1. Confirm the operational need, considering changes
in policy or threat since the initial Secretary
of Defense decision.
2. Establish and substantiate the specific perform-
ance objectives including the reliability and
maintainability requirements.
3. Present results of test and evaluation accomplished
to date, an updated statement of critical ques-
tions and areas of risk still needing resolution
by test, and a detailed statement of test plans
and milestones (DoD Directive 5000.3).
4. Present results of cost, performance, and
schedule trade-off analyses, and cost effec-
tiveness studies as required.
5. Present the design-to-cost goals and rationale.
6. Identify and evaluate the logistic support
alternatives including their impact on design.
7. Identify issues which must be resolved prior
to DSARC III and ensure that the program is
adequate to resolve them.
D. Normally, DCP III, which supports the decision by
the Secretary of Defense to enter the Production/
Deployment Phase will accommodate the basic objec-
tives above and place added emphasis on the
following areas:*o
1. Confirm the operational need, considering
changes in policy or threat since the previous
Secretary of Defense decision.
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2. Evaluate the degree of achievement of perform-
ance objectives including reliability and
maintainability.
3. Provide an assessment of system producibility,
operational suitability, and logistic support-
ability.
4. Present (a) an assessment of the development
and operational test and evaluation results
and readiness of the system to enter produc-
tion, and (b) the scope and schedule for any
test and evaluation still to be accomplished.
(DoD Directive 5000.3).
5. Present results of cost, performance, and
schedule trade-off analyses and cost effec-
tiveness analyses as required. (These
analyses shall relate to acquisition, oper-
ating and support costs)
.
6. Describe the procurement plan, including any
options and how it relates to the proposed
contract.
7. Validate that technical risks have been
eliminated or are in hand.
8. Present the integrated logistic support plan
and production plan.
E. Normally, for ship programs, DCP I, II and III will
be developed when preparing to start Preliminary
Design, Contract Design and Detailed Design (for
the first procurement -funded ship) respectively.






ESTABLISHING NEEDS AND GOALS
1. Start new system acquisition program with agency head
statements of needs and goals that have been reconciled
with overall agency capabilities and resources.
(a) State program needs and goals independently of any
system product. Use long-term projections of
mission capabilities and deficiencies prepared and
coordinated by agency component(s) to set program
goals that specify:
(1) Total mission costs within which new systems
should be bought and used
(2) The level of mission capability to be achieved
above that of projected inventories and existing
systems
(3) The time period in which the new capability
is to be achieved.
(b) Assign responsibility for responding to statements
of needs and goals to agency components in such a
way that either:
(1) A single agency component is responsible for
developing system alternatives when the mission need
is clearly the responsibility of one component; or
(2) Competition between agency components is formally
recognized with each offering alternative system
solutions when the mission responsibilities overlap.
2. Begin congressional budget proceedings with an annual
review by the appropriate committees of agency missions,
capabilities, deficiencies, and the needs and goals for






3. Support the general fields of knowledge that are related
to an agency's assigned responsibilities by funding pri-
vate sector sources and Government in-house technical
centers to do:
(a) Basic and applied research
(b) Proof of concept work
(c) Exploratory subsystem development. Restrict sub-
system development to less than fully designed
hardware until identified as part of a system
candidate to meet a specific operational need.
4. Create alternative system candidates by:
(a) Soliciting industry proposals for new systems with
a statement of the need (mission deficiency) ; time,
cost, and capability goals; and operating constraints
of the responsible agency and component (s) , with
each contractor free to propose system technical
approach, subsystems, and main design features.
(b) Soliciting system proposals from smaller firms that
do not own production facilities if they have:
(1) Personnel experienced in major development and
production activities
(2) Contingent plans for later use of required
equipment and facilities.
(c) Sponsoring, for agency funding, the most promising
system candidates selected by agency component heads
from a review of those proposed, using a team of
experts from inside and outside the agency component
development organization.
5. Finance the exploration of alternative systems by:
(a) Proposing agency development budgets according to
mission need to support the exploration of alterna-
tive system candidates.
(b) Authorizing and appropriating funds by agency mission
area in accordance with review of agency mission
needs and goals for new acquisition programs.
(c) Allocating agency development funds to components by
mission need to support the most promising system
candidates. Monitor components' exploration of
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alternatives at the agency head level through annual
budget and approval reviews using updated mission
needs and goals
.
6. Maintain competition between contractors exploring
alternative systems by:
(a) Limiting commitments to each contractor to annual
fixed-level awards, subject to annual review of
their technical progress by the sponsoring agency
component.
(b) Assigning agency representatives with relevant
operational experience to advise competing con-
tractors as necessary in developing performance
and other requirements for each candidate system
as tests and tradeoffs are made.
(c) Concentrating activities of agency development
organizations , Government laboratories , and
technical management staffs during the private
sector competition on monitoring and evaluating
contractor development efforts, and participating
in those tests critical to determining whether the
system candidate should be continued.
CHOOSING A PREFERRED SYSTEM
7. Limit premature system commitments and retain the
benefit of system-level competition with an agency head
decision to conduct competitive demonstration of candi-
date systems by:
(a) Choosing contractors for system demonstration depend-
ing on their relative technical progress, remaining
uncertainties, and economic constraints. The over-
riding objective should be to have competition at
least through the initial critical development
stages and to permit use of firm commitments for
final development and initial production.
(b) Providing selected contractors with the operational
test conditions, mission performance criteria, and
lifetime ownership cost that will be used in the
final system evaluation and selection.
(c) Proceeding with final development and initial pro-
duction and with commitments to a firm date for
operational use after the agency needs and goals
are reaffirmed and competitive demonstration results
prove that the chosen technical approach is sound
1 /. o

and definition of a system procurement program is
practical,
(d) Strengthening each agency's cost estimating
capability for:
(1) Developing lifetime ownership costs for use in
choosing preferred major systems
(2) Developing total cost projections for the number
and kind of systems to be bought for operational use
(3) Preparing budget requests for final development
and procurement.
8. Obtain agency head approval if an agency component deter-
mines that it should concentrate development resources on
a single system without funding exploration of competi-
tive system candidates. Related actions should:
(a) Establish a strong centralized program office within
an agency component to take direct technical and
management control of the program.
(b) Integrate selected technical and management con-
tributions from in-house groups and contractors.
(c) Select contractors with proven management, financial,
and technical capabilities as related to the problems
at hand. Use cost -reimbursement contracts for high
technical risk portions of the program.
(d) Estimate program cost within a probable range until
the system reaches the final development phase.
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
9. Withhold agency head approval and congressional commit-
ments for full production and use of new systems until
the need has been reconfirmed and the system performance
has been tested and evaluated in an environment that
closely approximates the expected operational conditions.
(a) Establish in each agency component an operational
test and evaluation activity separate from the
developer and user organizations.
(b) Continue efforts to strengthen test and evaluation
capabilities in the military services with emphasis
on:
(1) Tactically oriented test designers




(3) Tactical and environmental realism
(4) Setting critical test objectives, evaluation,
and reporting.
(c) Establish an agencywide definition of the scope of
operational test and evaluation to include:
(1) Assessment of critical performance character-
istics of an emerging system to determine useful-
ness to ultimate users
(2) Joint testing of systems whose missions cross
service lines
(3) Two-sided adversary-type testing when needed
to provide operational realism
(4) Operational test and evaluation during the
system life cycle as changes occur in need assess-
ment, mission goals, and as a result of technical
modifications to the system.
10. Use contracting as an important tool of system acquisi-
tion, not as a substitute for management of acquisition
programs. In so doing:
(a) Set policy guidelines within which experienced
personnel may exercise judgment in selectively
applying detailed contracting regulations.
(b) Develop simplified contractual arrangements and
clauses for use in awarding final development and
production contracts for demonstrated systems tested
under competitive conditions.
(c) Allow contracting officials to use priced production
options if critical test milestones have reduced
risk to the point that the remaining development work
is relatively straight forward.
ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND PERSONNEL
11. Unify policymaking and monitoring responsibilities for
major system acquisitions within each agency and agency
component. Responsibilities and authority of unified
offices should be to:
(a) Set system acquisition policy.
(b) Monitor results of acquisition policy.




(d) Act for the secretary in agency head decision points
for each system acquisition program.
(e) Establish a policy for assigning program managers
when acquisition programs are initiated.
(f) Insure that key personnel have long-term experience
in a variety of Government/ industry system acquisi-
tion activities and institute a career program to
enlarge on that experience.
(g) Minimize management layering, staff reviews,
coordinating points, unnecessary procedures, report-
ing, and paperwork on both the agency and industry
side of major system acquisitions.
12. Delegate authority for all technical and program decisions
to the operating agency components except for the key
agency head decisions of:
(a) Defining and updating the mission need and the goals
that an acquisition effort is to achieve.
(b) Approving alternative systems to be committed to
system fabrication and demonstration.
(c) Approving the preferred system chosen for final
development and limited production.
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